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The Secret is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market License Terms
Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes.
ABSTRACT: As patent protection has emerged to protect software, courts

and commentators have mistakenly focused on copyright law and overlooked
the centrality of patent preemption to limit contract law where a mass
market license which prohibits reverse engineering (RE) for purposes of
developing interoperable products leads to patent-like protection. Review of
copyright fair use cases on RE and Congress’s policy favoring RE for
interoperability purposes in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act reinforce
the case for patent preemption. Also, the fundamental freedom to RE
embodied in state trade secret law, coupled with federal patent and
copyright law and policies, cumulatively should override a contract barrier
on RE based upon the public policy exception to contract enforcement. If
courts fail to consider patent and public policy limits on contract, the
anomalous result is potential outsourcing of interoperability development to
one of the increasing number of foreign jurisdictions where interoperability
policy overrides contract law. Ironically, that would harm the U.S. economy
and thereby frustrate the purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution. Finally, the patent preemption/public policy invalidation
approach to mass market contracts outlined in this article may also provide
a new lens whenever a mass market contract results in a de-facto monopoly
on useful data.
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Part I. Introduction
Have you ever wondered why there are a limited number of products that can
work with Apple iTunes? For example, might you like to have more options on what cell
phones are compatible with iTunes or possibly buy something other than an iPod for
downloading music from iTunes?
One potential obstacle to such a world arguably is Apple’s attempt to use contract
law to prevent competitors from reverse engineering (RE) Apple’s software to discover
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and use the information which is needed for developing a product which can interoperate
with the iTunes platform (“interoperability information” or IO). Section 2 of the iTunes
license provides:
. . . Except as and only to the extent expressly permitted in this License or
by applicable law, you may not copy, decompile, reverse engineer,
disassemble, modify, or create derivative works of the Apple Software or
any part thereof. . . .2
The question arises whenever a technology provider such as Apple relies on
contract law to maintain a closed system, whether it be for game3, music4, instant
messaging5, personal computer or general telecommunications software.6 Should the
original technology provider be able to maintain a closed business model through the use
of a contract term7 that prohibits other participants from RE products to learn the
interfaces and protocols necessary to interoperate with the platform or utilize a file
format? Consumers may benefit from (1) alternative products which can work with a
preexisting platform, such as additional games or applications which can run on a closed
platform (e.g. having a choice of whether to buy an iPod or some other device that can
interoperate with the iTunes platform), (2) the ability to use existing games, other
applications software, or formatted data on an additional platform8 or (3) extended
functionality of an existing data format or communication protocols. Competitors may
benefit from being able to develop and market products that interoperate with the original
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Apple Computer, Inc. iTunes Software License Agreement, available at
http://www.apple.com/legal/sla/itunes.html (last visited January 16, 2006).
3
See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005), discussed infra at Part III.D.
4
See, for example, Real Network’s attempt to introduce software compatible with Apple iTunes. See also
infra Part V.C.
5
Consider, for example, the closed world of AOL instant messaging. Wouldn’t it be great if you could
share buddy lists and communicate amongst AOL, Yahoo and MSN instant messaging programs? Alas,
arguably one obstacle to such a world is AOL’s reliance on a contract term prohibiting RE to prevent others
from discovery and use of the IO needed to make this a reality. See Alexandra Krasne, A truce in the
instant-messaging wars? (August 24, 1999)(stating that “AOL accused Microsoft of illegally hacking into
its AOL Instant Messenger system to ensure interoperability.”), available at
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9908/24/truce.idg/ (last visited February 17, 2006).
6
See, e.g., Alcatel U.S.A., Inc. v. DGI Techs., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999), discussed infra, text
accompanying notes 232-34.
7
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (as amended 1996), 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2001), may provide
yet another means in the network environment for a closed technologist to attempt to enforce a closed
technology model. Discussion of this statute is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be discussed in a
forthcoming article. However, arguably courts should construe that statute to be consistent with patent and
trade secret laws and policies discussed in this Article to avoid arguable section 1030 claims. It is
interesting to note that Congress did consider this in enacting section 1201 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §1201 (2001), and did not require compliance with that act to be able to
reverse engineer for IO purposes under section 1201(f)(1)-(2). See generally infra, Part IV.B.
8
See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005), discussed infra, Part III.D; See also
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 154-59.
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technology. The question is whether these interests should outweigh the interests of the
original technology provider.9
Courts increasingly are enforcing RE terms such as Apple’s as a matter of
contract law and notwithstanding arguments of copyright preemption.10 Recently, the
Eighth and Federal Circuits applying California and Massachusetts law have enforced
mass market license terms which preclude RE, and the Seventh Circuit decision in
ProCD v. Zeidenberg11 may be interpreted to preclude discovery and use of IO to
develop an independent interoperable program.12 The net result is that a closed
technologist may forego a limited patent term in favor of state contract law as an
effective instrument to foreclose discovery and use of IO.
This article posits that a non-negotiated mass market license term should be
unenforceable to the extent it is interpreted to bar RE of IO and thereby creates patentlike rights to IO under the guise of state contract law. Two distinct but related rules
require invalidation of such a license term: (1) patent preemption; and (2) the public
policy exception to contract enforcement. The same reason lies at the heart of application
of both rules: the fundamental right to reverse engineer a publicly available product is
subverted by such non-negotiated clauses and Congress and the courts have consistently
affirmed the importance of interoperability in the computer and telecommunications
industries and the centrality of patent law in the area of protection of functional IO.
This article also suggests why courts and commentators have mistakenly focused
on copyright and contract law, rather than patent and trade secret law (and the interplay
among all four sources of law), in considering this issue. In sum, the enforceability
debate arose at a time when contract, trade secrets and copyright were the primary
theories for protection of software and serious doubt existed about the viability of patent
law.13 Now that patent is becoming an increasingly central form of legal protection of
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Academics have studied this question and deemed IO to be of paramount interest. See generally, Pamela
Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575
(2002) (providing overview of the topic). In addition, antitrust law has required compulsory licensing of
IO. See, for example, the Microsoft antitrust settlement, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9400/9495.htm (last visited 2/16/06).
10
See cases discussed infra, Part III.D. Interestingly, it is typically when fundamental issues are foreclosed
by a mass market license, such as access to judicial redress, courts have found ways to avoid enforcement.
See, e.g,, Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2002). As discussed in this article,
fundamental patent, copyright and trade secret policies are implicated by a mass market license term which
bars RE to discover IO.
11
86 F.3d 1447 (1996).
12
See cases discussed infra Part III.D.
13
Arguably for that reason, there has been scant analysis of the issue by careful study of patent and trade
secret law. Ironically, there was early discussion generally of patent preemption. See, e.g., Steven W.
Lundberg & John P. Sumner, Patent Preemption of Shrink-Wrap Prohibitions on Reverse Engineering,
COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1987, at 9; Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse
Engineering of Computer Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J.
25, 91-99 & n.339 (1993) (none of these authors focused on the five-factor test suggested in this Article).
See also commentators listed infra, note 108.
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software,14 it is critical to consider enforceability from the lens of the balance the
Supreme Court has adopted on the appropriate role for state regulation of functional
information such as IO (patentable subject matter) without impermissibly clashing with
patent law.
Viewed from this perspective, an analysis of Supreme Court decisions on patent
preemption of state trade secret and other IP laws strongly supports preemption of mass
market terms which prohibit RE solely for purposes of discovery and use of IO to
develop an independent interoperable product. This conclusion is based on two
assertions. First, the effect of enforcement of such terms is the creation of a form of state
IP protection which may be stronger, not weaker, than patent law. Second, enforcement
of such contract terms alters the delicate balance between federal and state regulation of
discovery and use of compatibility information. It is precisely such regulatory
competition concerning IP that the Supreme Court has consistently rejected by applying
patent preemption.
Courts have also not been presented with detailed analysis of the inherent tension
between enforcing a non-negotiated mass market license prohibition on RE and the
fundamental policy of trade secret law (founded on the importance of encouraging rather
than stifling competition in the marketplace) that it is lawful for a party to RE a publicly
available product. Properly presented, there is a compelling case that the basic contract
principle that terms contrary to public policy are unenforceable should invalidate such a
term solely to the extent that it prevents discovery and use of the information necessary
for a developer to make an independent interoperable.
This article posits a way for courts to overcome the patent preemption risk by
careful consideration of patent, copyright and trade secret law to appropriately interpret
or, when necessary, invalidate, as a matter of state contract public policy analysis,
contract terms restricting RE for purposes of interoperability. Thus by use of the tools of
contract interpretation, public policy, or patent preemption (solely as a last resort),
courts should hold that a mass market license restriction cannot prevent RE software
solely for purposes of discovery and use of IO.
Ironically, if courts do not undertake such an analysis, the result is to incent IO
developers to outsource such activities to one of the increasing number of key
jurisdictions where interoperability policy outweighs contract enforcement. That would
frustrate, rather than further, the underlying purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause of
the Constitution to foster within the United States “the introduction of new products and
processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased
employment and better lives for our citizens.”15

14

Bradford L. Smith & Susan O. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection in the Software
Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 242 (2004).

15

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
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Part II.

Background
A.

Evolution of Legal Protection and Distribution of Software to
License as Part of the Software

A brief review of the evolution of the legal protection of software and related
changes in the method for distributing software is critical to analyzing a non-negotiated
mass market license restriction on RE for purposes of developing an interoperable
product.
Ever since software gained prominence in the marketplace, debates have raged
over the proper legal bases for protection. Early on, doubt existed about both copyright
and patent protection.16 As such, software creators have always relied heavily on
contract law and trade secret law to protect their efforts.17
In the mid 20th century, software was but a part of a large, multi-faceted
transaction subject to an individually negotiated written contract which was physically
separate from the mainframe computer in which the software inhered. Initially doubts
existed about copyright and patent protection, so contract and trade secret were the only
firm anchors for protection. In 2006, software is now often distributed electronically and
regardless of whether it is distributed in a tangible medium or not, the license is a part of
the software code and that code may be protected by contract, trade secret, copyright, and
patent law.18
The first phase of software distribution was the mainframe computer world of
IBM and a few others.19 Starting in the middle of the 20th century, IBM led the way in
selling integrated computing packages to large customers. The package included a
mainframe computer, software and a service agreement by IBM to maintain and repair
the hardware and incidental software. Physically separate, but all important, was the
contract for this often multi-million dollar transaction. The contract was often pamphletlike in size and was individually negotiated between IBM and a single customer. This
multi-sheet contract included a license to the software. These sheets of paper were
physically separate from the hardware in which the software resided. In this phase the
model was often sale of the computer hardware (in which the software inhered) and
license of the IP rights in the software. The software was included in the hardware and
was distributed in machine readable (binary code) form. One term in the contract
prohibited RE of the software. Since only individually negotiated contracts were
16

See generally Smith & Mann, supra note 14 (outlining phases in the legal protection of software).
See id.at 243. See also, Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68
SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1242-44 (1995).
18
In addition, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2001), has
potential as a very broad form of protection for any information (whether protectable by IP or not) for any
software or data solely available on a computer—clearly an increasingly central method by which software
is made available. This Act will be part of a forthcoming article generally on limits to access and use of
information in the digital network environment (working title, “The Sleeping Giant of Data Protection
Awakens: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act”).
19
See generally Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 243-47.
17
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involved, there was no question about the enforceability of such a term because it solely
affected the party who negotiated the term, and did not affect the right of the public at
large. Initially, only contract and trade secret law unquestionably protected the software.
Commencing in the 1970s, the second phase20 of distribution occurred with the
advent of the personal computer and disaggregation of the distribution of software from
hardware. 21 It was at this juncture that paper contracts solely governing license of the
software gained significance.
During this period, the key legal debate was whether copyright or some sui
generis form of protection or patent law should be available to protect software.22 Some
of the concerns raised were that software is functional and accordingly did not fit well
under copyright law.23 Nonetheless, ever since the 1960s, software has been
copyrightable.24 In the decades since that time, the courts have addressed questions about
the scope of protection that copyright affords to software, particularly with an eye to
ensuring that functionality was not monopolized under the guise of copyright.25
The third phase unfolded in the 1980s with mass market adoption of the PC and
the resulting flood of separate software available for use. At this time, doubt remained
about whether software was patentable.26 The PC revolution unleashed a new
distribution model for software – the shrink wrap license (or “mass market” license or
20

See id. at 244-45.
This disaggregation forced the debate about respect for and remuneration for the software itself. See
William Henry Gates III, Letter to Hobbyists (February 3, 1976) (wherein Bill Gates pleaded with people
using (i.e. copying) MicroSoft’s software to pay for such copies, rather than “stealing” it, or else risk the
development of software for the emerging “hobbyist” market for the emerging PC. Thus, he asked, “Will
quality software be written for the hobby market?”). See
http://www.blinkenlights.com/classiccmp/gateswhine.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006). Had users not
ultimately responded to this model change, the software industry as we know it would not exist. Ironically,
we are returning to this issue once again with the rise of the Open Source Movement. See infra note 32.
Interestingly, there are some analogies between the free riders of software in the 1970s and the free riders
of music using file sharing technology at the turn of the 21st Century. Arguably in the case of music use by
file sharing, the combined effects of new business models such as Apple iTunes and the Supreme Court
decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005), are leading to a whole
new industry. Ironically, how competitive this new field will be may be effected by whether courts
consider the approach suggested in this Article. See Part V.C.
22
This debate culminated in the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU), Final Report (Library of Congress 1979). See also, Lemley, supra note 17.
23
See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984)(outlining concerns raised by
dissenting CONTU Commissioner John Hershey who argued that copyright should not “extend to a
computer program in the form in which it is capable of being used to control computer programs.”). See
also, CONTU Report, id. at 66-69 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Melville Nimmer suggests that
“copyright might be stretched to the breaking point if applied to software” (quoting Robert W.
Gomulkiewicz, Legal Protection for Software: Still a Work in Progress, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 445,
447 n. 6 (2002)).
24
See Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 243-44.
25
See e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1992) and discussion
infra Part IV.A.
26
See Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 253 and 244 n. 7.
21
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contract). The distribution model involved the vendor making a copy of the software
code onto a diskette, and then placing the diskette in a box along with a sheet of paper on
which the license terms were printed. The box was closed and shrink-wrapped in
cellophane. Early on, there was often no indication on the box informing consumers
what type of transaction was involved, but over time software vendors began including
standard language on the box to notify the “purchaser” (a misnomer unless viewed as
purchaser of a “license”) that a “license” was enclosed. That contract provided that the
storage medium was not in fact sold, but rather licensed to the user, along with a license
of the IP rights (typically copyright, now potentially patent) to use the program. In
addition, the program was distributed in machine readable object code to preserve trade
secrecy of the source code.
This new distribution model had 3 key attributes which were founded in contract
law (1) to license (not sell) a tangible storage medium;27 (2) to distribute code in machine
readable binary code (and thus preserve trade secrecy in the source code); and (3) to
license the intangible IP (typically copyright, now potentially patents too) which inhered
in the storage medium (the copy license/binary distribution/IP license model). By virtue
of this copy license/binary distribution/IP license model, software makers sought to rely
on contract to avoid the limitations imposed by the law from the sale of a particular
article in which IP rights inhere.28 The net effect of this copy license/binary
distribution/IP license model has been to enable the software “vendor” (an interesting
misnomer) to rely on contract (coupled with any other IP rights in software) to maintain
greater control over the software than permissible solely by copyright law, patent law or
trade secret law where an article is actually sold, rather than merely leased or licensed.29
As the software industry evolved in the 1980s, contract law thus was critical to
enable software makers to reap a return for their research, development and marketing
efforts, particularly in an era of uncertainty about the scope of copyright protection and
27

It is this issue which has led to the enormous debate over whether the copy of the software whose
possession is transferred under a mass market software license involves a sale of goods or a license of a
copy. See Lemley, supra at note 17, at n. 23 (describing the debate over the “fictional” status of a
shrinkwrap license and including authorities finding that the transaction involved a sale of goods). See also,
Steven A. Heath, Contracts, Copyright, and Confusion Revisiting the Enforceability of ‘Shrinkwrap’
Licenses, 5 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 12, 20-22 (2005)(discussing recent cases on the
“elusive nature of the software license”).

28

See Lemley supra note 17 at 1244-45 (“Software vendors needed proof that they were not in fact
disclosing their trade secrets by selling copies to whomever wanted them. To provide such proof, they
created the legal fiction that they were really licensing rather than selling their software. Because the
‘license’ contained provisions that required customers to keep the software confidential, the trade secrets
contained therein could be protected.”)
29
Interestingly the use of a distribution model in which the technologists seek to avoid a sale is not unique
to software. Professor Sean O’Connor has noted that AT&T used this model in leasing, rather than selling,
telephones to customers of the AT&T service. It was not until the antitrust settlement with the U.S.
government that the consumer was provided the option of actually purchasing the phone. In addition, with
the 1990 amendment of the Copyright Act to include a rental right which attaches to software, the mere fact
that software is sold does not extinguish all rights to control distribution of a copy. See infra text
accompanying note 35. This helps to focus the key issue on protection of the secret information (not
copyrightable expression) which inheres in the code.
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serious doubt about the existence of any patent protection.30 One key term in the typical
mass market license both then and now is a prohibition on RE, such as disassembling or
decompiling the machine readable code to discover the trade secret source code for the
program, which can include information necessary to develop a program that can be
compatible or interoperate with the software. In essence, software makers have used
contract law as a means to protect the valuable trade secrets which inhere in a program.
With the widespread adoption by the software industry of mass market licenses in
the 1980s, a debate ensued about the enforceability of this new form of licensing and
distribution model.31 At the time courts first began to address this issue, uncertainty
remained about patent protection for software but that doubt had already been resolved
for copyright. Consequently it is not surprising that a key argument presented to courts
beyond basic contract principles (such as assent, adhesion and unconscionability) was
whether certain aspects of mass market licenses are preempted by copyright law.
The fourth phase occurred in the 1990s when the license became part of the
software code.32 Software vendors began to include the license as part of the software
code in addition to placing a printed copy of the license in the box. Vendors coded
programs so that a user first had to read and agree to the terms of the license before any
access to the program was permissible. This phase is significant because it resulted in a
practical impossibility for a person to lawfully acquire a copy of the software separate
from the license.
The debate over enforceability continued in the 1990s but courts increasingly
ruled that mass market licenses were generally enforceable.33 In addition it became clear
that patent law protected software inventions. 34 Congress also amended the Copyright
Act in 1990 to extend the distribution right for copyright owners of general purpose
software to include rental and leasing of copies, notwithstanding any sale of those
particular copies.35
30

See, e.g., Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 241 (noting the “important impact [of IP laws] on the
software industry’s success”).
31
See Lemley, supra note 17, at n. 107 (listing commentators arguing that shrink-wrap licenses were
unenforceable). See also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market
Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 687 nn. 3-5 (2004) (summarizing the debate and
some of the participants).
32
Another significant development which emerged in the 1990s (and which is now reverberating through
the industry) was the open source movement. Under this approach, source code is published and
distributed—as such the software developer foregoes any trade secret rights in the software. Interestingly,
the “copyleft” part of this movement in fact is critically dependent upon license terms in an effort to
circumscribe the right of licensees from asserting copyright and patent rights. As such the copyleft General
Public License presents issues of potential misuse of copyright and patent which are beyond the scope of
this article, but it is yet another example where it is critical to scrutinize whether a license is being used in a
fashion consistent with all areas of IP law.
33
See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 31, 688 n.7.
34
See Smith & Mann, supra note 14, at 242 (“patent protection may emerge as a critical form of IP
protection for software”).
35
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, title VIII of the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat 5089, 5134, enacted December 1, 1990. One final largely unnoticed
development was the 1996 amendment of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to cover “any protected
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The fifth phase is currently occurring: the transition from tangible distribution to
software solely available electronically via the internet. Electronic availability36 simply
reinforces what occurred at the fourth phase—the license is solely the code. It is made
abundantly clear by the fact that there is no sheet of paper anymore, unless the end user
decides (perhaps at the vendor’s suggestion) to print a copy herself. This phase also has
involved some transformation from distribution of software to providing a service of
accessing software resident on a provider’s server.
The last development in cementing the transformation of the license to code is
Congress’s enactment of sections 1201 and 1202 of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998.37 The purpose of these sections is to address electronic distribution of
copyrighted works. Section 1201 effectively prevents reverse engineering of a
technological measure employed to protect a work. Section 1202 makes it unlawful to
separate the license from the copyrighted work. As such the copyrighted work and
license merge.
The distribution of software has evolved to the point that the license is now
typically part of the copyrighted code and any attempt to separate the license from the
rest of the code constitutes a violation of federal (and international)38 law. The
significance of this evolution is that in 2006 there may no longer be any practical way to
lawfully obtain the code without the license terms. There are no strangers who may
legally acquire software as a product in the marketplace free of a contractual term
prohibiting RE.39
This evolution to license as part of the software code is significant in light of the
Supreme Court’s test for determining whether state protection of IP is preempted by
computer” used in interstate or foreign commerce. The massive ramifications of this statute on the
protection of information (regardless of its copyrightability or patentability) have just begun to unfold in a
world where data is increasingly available primarily by a computer server accessible via the internet. See
e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 238, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1957 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 356
F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2004). See also, supra note 18.
36
“Availability” is used because different models have emerged for software: electronic distribution and
“software as service”. The latter may comport better with notions of enjoying a performance or display of
some intellectual creation, rather than distribution of copies. The 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty recognized
that availability would be increasingly important when it established a right to make available a work under
Article 8 (the “Right of Communication to the Public”) of the Treaty.
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html#P78_9739 (last visited January 16, 2006).
37
17 U.S.C. §1201-2 (2001).
38
See art. 6, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty 1996.
39
Of course regardless of how one acquires an article in which copyright and patent rights inhere, the mere
fact that no contract terms control or restrict use does not absolve the possessor of the article of any rights
which might be asserted by a copyright or patent owner. See e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1574 (7th Cir. 1996) (“federal copyright laws of their own force would limit the finder’s ability to copy or
transmit the application program.”). The point of the text above is that due to the fact that the license is
part of the code and one cannot access the code without first accessing the license, it is hard to see how one
could attain a status equivalent of say a holder in due course who takes free of any prior claims to a
negotiable instrument. My thanks to Professor Sean O’Connor for raising the analogy of the law of
negotiable instruments. See also discussion infra, text at notes 189-201.
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patent law. Although it is now clear that patent law can protect methods by which a
computer program interoperates with other programs and hardware,40 there has been
surprisingly little attention focused specifically on the barrier a mass market license
restriction on RE places on the discovery and use of trade secret IO necessary to develop
an interoperable program and the implications of enforcement of such terms on patent
and trade secret law.41
Due to the timing of legal developments and changes in the distribution model for
software, two issues have not received adequate focus. First, since prohibiting RE has
always been a contract term, minimal attention has been given to the implication of a
mass market license term on the fundamental trade secret law principle of the freedom to
RE a publicly available product. Second, since it is only recently that patent law has
gained prominence in protecting software, scant attention has been given to the interplay
between patent and contract law.
B.

Reverse Engineering of Software42

RE is nothing new. For centuries individuals have acquired competitors’ products
in the marketplace, disassembled them to understand how they worked, and copied them
to build competitive products. Where no IP rights inhere in a particular product, the well
accepted principle is that any person can buy the product and thereafter RE it (i.e.
disassemble and study the product) to copy features and build a competitive product.43
In the computer industry context, RE may be undertaken for cloning purposes. A
competitor may seek to RE a product in order to clone it. Here, the competitor simply
wants to copy the product (including all its functionality and methods of operation) in its
entirety. If an original developer elects to preserve the secrecy of source code
information for software, then the ability to RE the software is extremely helpful to a
competitor in understanding the method of operation and other details contained in the
source code for the targeted program. 44 In this case, it is possible for the competitor to
40

See e.g., United States Patent No. 6,968,438 issued November 22, 2005( Application programming
interface with inverted memory protocol for embedded software systems.”) (Texas Instruments Inc.,
assignee); United States Patent No. 6,965,925 issued November 15, 2005 (Distributed open architecture for
media and telephony services which includes language independent interface; Background to Invention
Section specifically notes: “As telephony applications have become more numerous and complex,
interoperability problems have arisen.”)(Nortel Networks, Ltd., assignee); United States Patent No.
6,968,555 issued November 22, 2005 (“Multi-layer software architecture for hardware control” which is
described in abstract as “[a] software system having a multi-layer architecture for controlling a hardware
system.”)(Agilent Technologies, Inc., assignee). See also infra, note 275.
41
See infra Parts II.F, III.C, III.D, and IV.
42
See generally, Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 843 (1994)(often-cited article describing what is technically involved in RE software).
43
See discussion infra Part II.E.
44
Although there is a growing movement under which all source-code information is published freely with
the software (see e.g. discussion of Open Source and Free Software Movements,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html) (last visited on January 16, 2006), a very
large segment of the computer software and hardware industry continues to elect a model of object code
distribution which enables preservation of trade secrets which inhere in the code.

11

compete with the original program without RE. However, RE reduces the research and
development costs of the competitor because it can simply free ride on the prior research
and development of the original party. Thus the competitor has a choice—the easier road
or the harder road. The easier road is to RE the original software to copy/clone the
product. The harder way is to learn the capabilities of the product from intelligent
observation of the product in public use in the marketplace and study of published
materials about the original product and thereafter undertake the necessary research and
development costs and time to develop the competing program.
However software, by its nature, presents a second RE scenario that cannot be
adequately addressed through a cloning analysis. Software programs often benefit from
working or interoperating with other programs.45 Interoperation typically requires the
ability to manage, store, or package data in a particular format defined by the original
developer. This presents a challenge when the original developer of the interface or
format has chosen a closed model in which information about the interface or format is
not published (the “closed technologist”). For example, Apple has elected to keep the
iTunes platform closed (as has AOL for its instant messaging) and does not publish the
interface specifications needed for a competitor to develop a product to interoperate with
iTunes. It is for this reason that a consumer who wishes to use iTunes must acquire an
iPod, rather than some device of a third party.46
In such cases, a developer that wishes to interoperate with the original program’s
format or interface must undertake some degree of RE to understand information
concerning the methods of operation and data formats that enable interoperability with
the targeted program.47 For purposes of this article, such information that is necessary to
develop an independent interoperable program is defined as “interoperability
information” (IO). This definition is consistent with the approach to interoperability in
federal, state and European law.48 It is this second RE scenario that is the subject of this
article.
C.

The Detection Paradox

Courts may be asked to enforce restrictions on RE of software in a spectrum of
circumstances. One significant ironic implication of broad interpretation of clauses
restricting RE to include IO is the presence of a “detection paradox” under certain
45

See generally Johnson-Laird, supra at note 42, at 852-56.
To the extent that a party might have patents which read on the IO, the existence of the patent would
require the disclosure of the IO. The question for the competitor would then squarely be whether the
patentee agreed to license any such IO patents.
47
See generally Johnson-Laird, supra at note 42, at 852-56. The original technologist may elect to preserve
trade secrets concerning the internal operation of its software, yet publish the information concerning the
methods of operation by which a program interoperates and formats data. In such a case an interoperability
developer can use that published IO to develop an interoperable product and it would not be necessary for
the developer to reverse engineer the original software.
48
Section 1201(f) of the DMCA (discussed infra, Part IV.B); Section 118 of the Uniform Computer
Information Act (UCITA)(discussed infra, note 259), and Article 6 of the European Union Software
Directive (discussed infra, note 289).
46
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scenarios. The detection paradox can be seen by comparing the actions and purposes of
two distinct types of actors in the marketplace: the “cloner” and the “IO developer”.
Each reverse engineers software to discover secret information in a program. However
the scope of information sought to be discovered and the purpose of discovering that
information is very different for the cloner than for the interoperability developer.
The cloner reverse engineers a competitor’s software program to study secrets
throughout the original technologist’s program. As a result of this RE, the cloner then
copies and uses various secrets in developing its product and free rides on the research
and development time, cost and effort of the original developer embodied in those secrets.
The cloner’s product competes with the targeted software but does not interoperate.
The interoperability developer seeks to develop a program that will interoperate
with the targeted program. RE is limited to discovery, study and analysis of the targeted
program’s IO. The information is used to develop an independent49 program which
incorporates only such information as is necessary to interoperate with another program50.
Both products are introduced into the market. Which one is more likely to be
detected by the targeted technologist as involving RE of secrets? The interoperable
product. Its “interoperability” capability will be an immediate red flag to the original
technologist in contrast to the cloner’s product which, though bearing similarities, has no
red flag which raises the question of potential misappropriation of trade secrets.
One can only hypothesize about the marketplace prevalence of RE for cloning
purposes.51 The point is that it seems paradoxical to have a rule which is more likely to
penalize the actor who is engaging in activity which is relatively more favored in the law
49

“Independent” as used herein means that the program does not infringe any copyrightable expression of
the targeted program. However, “independent” does not mean that the program may not risk infringement
of any patents which read on the “independent” program, including any relating to IO.
50
Note here that the “other” program may be either the targeted program (see, e.g., Sega Enters. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)) or another program which interoperates with the reverse
engineered program (see, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t v. Connectix Corp., 203 F. 3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
51

It is worth noting that with the rise in the Open Source Movement, there arguably has developed a culture
within that community of an entitlement of free access to source code even where protected by a contract
prohibiting RE. See e.g., Brendan Chase, Gosling Questions Sun-Microsoft Pact, February 4, 2005
http://builder.com.com/5100-6370_14-5563465.html (last visited January 16, 2005)(quoting James Gosling
of Sun Microsystems: "In the past, what we'd have to do is reverse-engineering, and we had been getting
into a pickle, because for open-source projects like Samba and OpenOffice, the only way to get the
information was by reverse-engineering," he said. "Pretty much for all the countries in the world, reverseengineering was a perfectly fine thing to do.") If that is the case and such RE occurs solely to learn secrets
about proprietary programs unrelated to interoperability which is then used by the OSS community, there is
a very real possibility of leakage of trade secrets that are unrelated to IO. This is very significant in light of
the Kewanee assumption of “weakness” of state trade secret law vis a vis federal patent protection. See
discussion infra Part III.C. In passing it is interesting to note the parallel of free riding in the OSS
movement and the free riders of copyrighted music and sound recordings by use of file sharing technology.
See supra, note 21.
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(interoperability)52 than the party solely free riding on the trade secrets of a competitor.
Thus it is unlikely that there will be an undetected leakage of IO trade secrets, whereas
such trade secret leakage may occur without detection in the case of the cloner. This
Detection Paradox is a factor relevant to patent preemption discussed in Part III C.
D.

Law and Economics Perspectives

Although there has been much debate, there is no firm conclusion from a law and
economics perspective on whether RE of software for purposes of interoperability is
beneficial. In one of the leading articles on the law and economics of RE of software,
Professors Samuelson and Scotchmer concluded:
The economic case for allowing reverse engineering to achieve interoperability is
not as open and shut as some legal commentators have suggested. We believe,
however, that interoperability has, on balance, more beneficial than harmful
economic consequences. Hence, a legal rule permitting reverse engineering of
programs to achieve interoperability is economically sound.53
Although they concluded that a legal rule in support of RE for interoperability purposes is
“sound”, Samuelson and Scotchmer noted that there is debate about the benefits of a
closed versus open model.54
Given that the debate continues, it is worth noting the cumulative implications of
five considerations concerning regulation of IO not reviewed collectively to date: (1) the
detection difficulties in the less justifiable case of RE to clone software features as
contrasted with the relative ease of identifying potential RE where interoperability is
involved; (2) the transformation of trade secret rights in IO from weak in personam rights
to property-like rights by wholesale enforceability of shrink-wrap and web-wrap licenses
without considering patent and trade secret law; (3) the detailed teachings of the Supreme
Court on patent preemption in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.55 and Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.56; (4) the competition in regulation of IO between federal
patent law and state protection by enforcement of non-negotiated mass market license
terms restricting RE; and (5) a comparative law analysis showing that an increasing
number of key jurisdictions have adopted a legal rule permitting such RE notwithstanding
any contrary contract prohibition.
In addition to the law and economics rationale identified by Samuelson and
Scotchmer, these five considerations provide compelling support for a legal rule
permitting RE for interoperability purposes notwithstanding a mass market contract
restriction to the contrary to avoid conflicts with fundamental limits on state trade secret

52

See discussion infra Part IV.B.
Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 9, at 1608.
54
Id.
55
416 U.S. 470 (1974).
56
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
53
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law and the patent laws enacted under the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution.57
E.

State Trade Secret Law58

Trade secrets have been protected by an amalgam of theories including tort,
equity, contract and “property”59. Although the scope of information potentially
protected is quite broad and arguably solely limited by a test of some commercial value,
there are several key limits on the scope of protection. These limits are where
information is (1) readily ascertainable from public sources; (2) available by independent
discovery; or (3) subject to discovery by proper means.
The most critical “proper means” is a competitor’s freedom to RE a product that it
lawfully acquires in the marketplace.60 This freedom to RE reflects the underlying policy
of encouraging competition. The Supreme Court has highlighted this freedom as a key
limit to the scope of trade secret protection under state law. 61
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Kewanee, the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (USTA) was adopted as a model for adoption by the states, and has since
been adopted by 45 states and the District of Columbia.62 The Prefatory Note to the
USTA makes clear that the ability to RE a product available in the marketplace is a
57

In fact, the failure to adopt such an approach is unlikely to lead to the desired outcome of preventing such
RE. Rather, it will simply incent developers to undertake such activities in jurisdictions which have
adopted such a rule—whether that is in particular states in the U.S. or-- as is more likely-- in foreign
jurisdictions which permit such activity. See, e.g., Colloquium, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How
Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U CHI. L. REV. 223, (2004) [hereinafter Intellectual
Property Arbitrage]. Further, it arguably disadvantages small enterprises that may not have the ability to
move such activities to a favorable jurisdiction.
58
The general discussion is based upon both the Restatement of Torts, Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965), and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1985).
59
In Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 215 (2002), the California Supreme Court,
quoting Justice Holmes, rejected the “property” theory of trade secrets, and held that the California Trade
Secrets Act is based upon the relationship theory:
Underlying this theory is the concept that a trade secret is in the nature of property, which
is damaged or destroyed by the adverse use . . . California does not treat trade secrets as if
they were property. It is the relationship between the parties at the time the secret is
disclosed that is protected. The protected relationship, contractual or confidential, is one
to which, as Mr. Justice Holmes observed, 'some rudimentary requirements of good faith'
are attached. ‘Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property
may be denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present
matter is not property . . ., but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiffs . . .’ (E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland (1917) 244 U.S. 100,
102, 37 S.Ct. 575, 576, 61 L.Ed.2d 1016.)
219-20.
60
Kewanee, 416 U.S.; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.
61
See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.; discussion infra Part III; Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA) §118 cmt. 3 (2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm (last
visited Jan. 9, 2006) (citing Bonito Boats as authority). See also discussion infra Part V.A.
62
See ULA database on Westlaw (last visited Dec. 16, 2005).
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fundamental touchstone which limits and distinguishes trade secret from patent
protection:
The Uniform Act codifies the basic principles of common law trade secret
protection, preserving its essential distinctions from patent law. Under
both the Act and common law principles, for example, more than one
person can be entitled to trade secret protection with respect to the same
information, and analysis involving the "reverse engineering" of a
lawfully obtained product in order to discover a trade secret is
permissible.63
Likewise, the Comment to Section 1 of the UTSA, which illustrates actionable
trade secret misappropriation, makes clear that RE of a product that is lawfully acquired
in the marketplace is a proper means of discovering a secret:
Proper means include:
2. Discovery by "reverse engineering", that is, by starting with the known product
and working backward to find the method by which it was developed. The
acquisition of the known product must, of course, also be by a fair and honest
means, such as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse engineering to
be lawful. . . .
Trade secret law also requires the secret to be “the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”64 One reasonable step to
protect a trade secret is contract. In this context, contract law is merely the instrument
through which the underlying policy of protecting a trade secret is affected.65 As a
general rule, courts will enforce contract terms. However, contracts are unenforceable
where they are unconscionable, preempted by federal law, or contrary to public policy. 66
Against this backdrop, we now consider mass market license restrictions on RE.
F.

The Proper Role of Contract in Support of Trade Secrets

Although there has been debate on whether mass market license restrictions on
RE clauses should be preempted by virtue of federal copyright policy67, and some general
63

Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1985).
Id. §1(4)(ii).
65
See David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract, and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software
License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 547 n.13 (1992); see also
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 901 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003) (Moreno, J., concurring)
(“[t]o be sure, contract plays an important role in trade secret law by protecting the trade secret holder
against ‘unauthorized use or disclosure through a contract with the recipient of a disclosure’ or others who
have had a special access to trade secret information, via confidentiality agreements and the like. (Rest. 3d
Unfair Competition, § 41, com. D, p. 471, italics added.)”)
66
See Part V.A infra.
67
See e.g., Maureen O’Rourke, Drawing The Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995); Lemley, supra note 17 at 1255-59;
Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law,
64
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discussion about patent policy,68 minimal attention has focused on the dramatic
implications for state trade secret law.
The traditional notion of the appropriate instrumental role of contract restrictions
to preserve secrets made sense when individually negotiated contracts were involved or
courts could reasonably imply contractual obligations based upon trust, confidence, or
other special relationship. As such, trade secrets are not “property” but rather
enforceable as in personam rights. As discussed above, a key doctrinal limit is the
general distribution and availability in the marketplace of a product which then exposes
the trade secret to potential discovery, analysis, and use by RE (i.e., “lawful
appropriation” or “fair means”).
But as some courts have come to accept mass market licenses in their entirety as
enforceable,69 there has not been any in-depth consideration by the courts of the
implications on the scope of trade secrets and the inherent limitation on trade secret
protection by virtue of the fundamental freedom to RE any product publicly available in
the marketplace.70 At its core, contract law enforcement of a non-negotiated mass market
license barring RE subverts the fundamental principle of trade secret law that a
competitor is free to RE a product which is publicly available in the marketplace. The
net result is the transformation of an in personam right to protect trade secret information
into a property right in that information.
Thus what had until recently been a state law right in trade secrets circumscribed
by the doctrine of permissible RE of mass distributed products has now potentially
expanded effectively by contract law (including choice of law terms) into a nation-wide
property right without any of the limitations built into other IP regimes, such as novelty,
nonobviousness, experimental use, first sale, fair use, or misuse.

13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 827, 861-67, at 67 (1998)(focusing on copyright preemption and in fact
expressly rejecting applicability of patent preemption to software licenses: “Of course, however, Bonito by
its very terms does not state a principle that pertains to state laws that enable parties to enforce relationships
they have created. Trade secret law, contract law, and similar relationship contexts fall well outside the
parameters of the decision in Bonito.”). For the reasons outlined in this article, see in particular discussion
at Part III, I beg to differ with Professor Nimmer’s appraisal of the lack of relevance of Bonito to the
question of the enforceability of a mass market license term. See also cases discussed infra Part III.D; See
also Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 9 (no mention of patent preemption).
68
See McManis, supra note 13, at 94; Rice, supra note 65, at 577-95; Mark I. Koffshy, Note, Patent
Preemption of Computer Software Contracts Restricting Reverse Engineering: The Last Stand?, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1160, 1169-87 (1995)(see discussion of commentators at note 17). Almost all discussion has
focused on federal preemption of shrink-wrap licenses based solely upon copyright policy. See e.g.,
O’Rourke, supra note 67. The discussion here is on fundamental state law policy of protecting trade
secrets. The drafters of UCITA recognized this tension. See supra note 61.
69
See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 302 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung,
422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
70
But see DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864 (2003) (Moreno, J., concurring); discussion
infra Parts IV.C, V.B. See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68
SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1268 (1995)(“Reverse engineering of a trade secret is explicitly allowed
by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Thus, the Act conflicts with contract law where the contract provides
that a licensee may not reverse engineer the licensed product.”)
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Several commentators have noted this dramatic transformation of in personam
contract-supported trade secret law to “rights against the world”71 which is further
cemented in the context of web-based delivery of software:
If [licensors] then combine this power [of web wrap license assent] with
the power inherent in [shrink-wrap license enforceability] to impose nonnegotiable, standard terms and conditions on those who seek access … the
net effect is privately to impose “rights ‘against the world-at-large.’” In
short, when the power of the two-party deal in the digital universe is
combined with the power to impose non-negotiable terms, it produces
contracts (not “agreements”) that are roughly equivalent to private
legislation that is valid against the world. 72
The drafters of UCITA also appreciated the undeniable and fundamental tension between
freedom of contract and competing federal policies and trade secret policies in the case of
mass market licensing of software. 73
With this background on trade secret law and the potential tension created by
mass market license enforceability on the scope of trade secret protection, review of
federal IP law and policies on IO is in order.
III.

Patent Preemption
A.

The Basis for Patent Preemption: Prevention of IP Regulatory
Competition in Patent-Like Monopolies Between the U.S. and the
States

The Supreme Court has held that the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution74 does not occupy the field and thereby forbid the States75 to act at all to
regulate IP.76 In contrast, Professor Arthur Miller has recently commented that the issue

71

See discussion infra accompanying note 142.
J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 911 (1999) (quoting
U.C.C. §2B-105, reporter’s notes, no.1 (proposed Official Draft Aug. 1998)).
73
See the Official Comment to section 105 of UCITA, discussed infra at Part IV.
74
Art. I, §8, cl. 8.
75
There are limits in the IP Clause on Congress’ grant of power to create monopolies under patent law. See
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)(“The Patent Clause itself reflects
a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle
competition without any concomitant advance in the Progress of Science and Useful Arts [which] contains
both a grant of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power.”)(giving as examples that
Congress cannot “create patent monopolies of unlimited duration, . . . [or] whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.” ).
76
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state regulation of unauthorized recordings of
performances were Constitutional “writings” not preempted by copyright law); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (no patent preemption of state regulation of trade secrets including use of
negotiated contract to enforce a secret (whether patentable or not)).
72
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of what limits the IP Clause places on state regulation of IP has varied over time and
noted that a dormant IP Clause view was espoused by Learned Hand:
Justice Hand believed that the Constitution embodied a federal policy of
competition and public access to literary and artistic creativity. The presumption
was that everything that could be considered a “writing” or “discovery” lies in the
public domain unless Congress chooses to protect it (which Congress can do only
for limited times and only for “advancing science and the useful arts”). Congress
must be the sole arbiter of what works are entitled to protection, according to the
Hand analysis, and thus, even when Congress has failed to act, states must refrain
from doing so. This “dormant” copyright and patent power prohibits states from
regulating any subject matter or creating any rights that fall within the scope of
the constitutional clause.77
Although the Supreme Court in Kewanee78 and Bonito Boats79 rejected the idea of
a dormant Patent Clause which would preempt state regulation absent Congressional
action or intent, Professor Miller has suggested that the discussion in Bonito Boats is
dicta:
A future Court, more sympathetic to the claims of federal hegemony and wary of
the vagaries and parochialisms of different state laws in a world of national
media, distribution, and marketing, could effect yet another jurisprudential shift,
especially if a state-created right presented a serious obstacle to achieving a
congressional objective.80
Interestingly, the concerns raised by Professor Miller if state regulation is “a
serious obstacle to achieving a congressional objective” are precisely met by reference to
statutory conflicts preemption as articulated by Chief Justice Burger in Kewanee81 and do
not require reliance on a dormant IP clause jurisprudence.82 In fact, Professor Miller’s
77

Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come,
119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 747, n. 171 (2006) (citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221
F.2d 657, 664-68 (2d Cir. 1955)(Hand, J., dissenting).
78
416 U.S. at 479 (Burger, C.J.)(italics added):
Just as the States may exercise regulatory power over writings so may the States regulate with
respect to discoveries. States may hold diverse viewpoints in protecting intellectual property to
invention as they do in protecting the intellectual property relating to the subject matter of
copyright. The only limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and
copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress. . . .
79
489 U.S. at 165 (“Our decisions since Sears and Compco have made it clear that the Patent and
Copyright Clauses do not, by their own force or by negative implication, deprive the States of the power to
adopt rules for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions.”)
80
Miller, supra note 77, at 749.
81
416 U.S. at 479.
82
There might be some scenario that might lead to reference to a dormant IP clause argument, but arguably
the statutory conflicts analysis which is discussed in this Article will suffice in most instances since in the
case of patent preemption, the Supreme Court has held that the patent laws themselves reflect
Congressional policies on the balance between free competition and the need to create statutory rights to
incent “discoveries” in the useful arts. See discussion infra, text accompanying note 90. See also
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.546, 558 (1973)(noting that “[t]he standards established for granting
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language tracks that used by the Supreme Court in its decisions dealing with patent law
conflicts preemption. Thus, the Court has held that state law (whether statute or
contract)83 is preempted where the effect of enforcement of the state regulation conflicts
84
or clashes85 with the operation of the federal patent and copyright laws.86 The
underlying premise in Supreme Court patent preemption decisions is an express rejection
of regulatory competition between federal patent law and some equivalent form of state
regulation of IP for functional matter, whether patentable or not:
States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual creations which
would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law. Both the
novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are
grounded in the notion that concepts within the public grasp, or those so
obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all.
They provide the baseline of free competition upon which the patent
system’s incentive to creative effort depends. . . . Moreover, through the
creation of patent-like rights, the States could essentially redirect inventive
efforts away from the careful criteria of patentability developed by
Congress over the last 200 years.87
The question is whether a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”88 in striking a balance to
create incentives to invention and disclosure by granting a limited monopoly right for
methods of operation, processes and other “useful arts.”89 The Court has concluded that
federal patent protection to machines thus indicated not only which articles in this particular category
Congress wished to protect, but which configurations it wished to remain free.”) From a dormant IP Clause
perspective, Burger C.J. in Goldstein did suggest that where state regulation “will prejudice the interests of
other States [rather than effect protection] within its boundaries” there might be a case of IP Clause
preemption. Id. at 558. See also Kozinki J.’s reference to this proposition in his dissent in White v.
Samsung Electronics, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993): “Under the dormant Copyright Clause, state
intellectual property laws can stand only so long as they don’t ‘prejudice the interests of other states.’ A
state law criminalizing record piracy, for instance, is permissible because citizens of other states would
remain free to copy within their borders those works which may be protected elsewhere.’ But the right of
publicity isn’t geographically limited.” (quoting without citation to Burger, C.J. in Goldstein, id.)
Interestingly, the case of a mass market license, which typically includes an enforceable choice of law
clause (and thus has nation-wide effect), would be subject to a dormant IP clause preemption, but that issue
need not be addressed because it so squarely falls under the patent conflicts preemption analysis outlined
infra, Part III.C. Another possible application of dormant IP Clause preemption would be mass market
terms limiting fair use/free speech on a nation-wide basis. See e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entertainment Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2003) (copyright misuse might apply to free speech
restriction, but not in particular case); Ty, Inc. v. Publications Intern., Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir.
2002)(Posner J. noting concerns with copyright license term which restricted criticism by licensee of
licensor).
83
See id. (Florida statute); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (enforcement of license preempted).
84
See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479.
85
See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
86
See generally Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (general review of the
different theories of preemption of state law).
87
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156-57.
88
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
89
See id. at 480; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
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the “novelty and nonobviousness requirements [of patent law] express a congressional
determination that the purposes behind the Patent Clause are best served by free
competition and exploitation of either that which is already available to the public or that
which may be readily discerned from publicly available material.”90
In a nutshell, although there is no preemption of the field of regulating IP, the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution91 requires preemption of any state law which either
(1) provides a party (whether investor or inventor) a realistic and potentially preferable
option to the limited term monopoly grant offered by patent law, or (2) provides patentlike protection for functional matter which does not meet the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements of patent law and thereby stifles competition in such matter without any
concomitant advance in the Progress of Science and Useful Arts. This is because “state
regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent it clashes with the balance
struck by Congress in our patent laws” . . . [to resolve the constant] tension between the
desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to create
an incentive to deploy those resources.” 92
Indeed, trade secret law itself has been considered as potentially preempted by
patent law. In Kewanee, the Supreme Court held that Ohio trade secret law as sought to
be enforced by the plaintiff was not preempted by federal patent law.93 It was “central”
to the Court’s determination of no preemption that Ohio state trade secret law provided
“weaker” protection than patent law.94 Accordingly, state regulation of trade secrets did
not jeopardize the underlying purposes of patent law and lead to regulatory competition
between state regulation and patent law. The Kewanee decision was not unanimous.
Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented because the product in Kewanee was patentable,
and they determined that “Congress in the patent laws decided that where no patent
existed, free competition should prevail.”95

90

Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150.
Art. VI, cl. 2.
92
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
93
Kewanee, 416 U.S.
94
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 155. (The Court in Bonito Boats specifically made this assessment of its prior
decision in Kewanee).
95
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 495. Interestingly, Justice Douglas concluded that it was only the permanent
injunction issued by the district court that was preempted by patent law:
A suit to redress theft of a trade secret is grounded in tort damages for breach of a contract – a
historic remedy. Damages for breach of a confidential relation are not pre-empted by this patent
law, but an injunction against use is pre-empted because the patent law states the only monopoly
over trade secrets that is enforceable by specific performance; and that monopoly exacts as a price
full disclosure. A trade secret can be protected only by being kept secret. Damages for breach of
a contract are one thing; an injunction barring disclosure does service for the protection accorded
valid patents and is therefore pre-empted.
Id. at 498-99. Adoption of this approach would effect a compulsory license of the trade secret, and lead to
the same outcome some are now positing for patent law reform where injunctive relief might not be
available for patent trolls. See Patent Reform Bill 2005. See also EBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 401
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2005)(No. 05-130)(is patentee
entitled to injunctive relief as matter of right or based upon equitable principles).
91

21

In contrast, where state protection would give rise to regulatory competition in IP
laws or protect utilitarian matter which has does not qualify for patent protection, it has
been preempted.96 For that reason, the Florida boat hull protection statute was preempted
in Bonito Boats by a unanimous Court:
One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses
of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of
intellectual property. . . . Since the Patent Act of 1800, Congress has
lodged exclusive jurisdiction of actions “arising under” the patent laws in
the federal courts, thus allowing for the development of a uniform body of
law in resolving the constant tension been private right and public
access. . . . Recently, Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction of all
patent appeals on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in order to
“provide nationwide uniformity in patent law.” . . . This purpose is
frustrated by the Florida scheme, which renders the status of the design
and utilitarian “ideas” embodied in the boat hulls it protects uncertain.
Given the inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas, and the great
power such property has to cause harm to the competitive policies which
underlay the federal patent laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public
and private right is “the type of regulation that demands a uniform national
rule.” . . . Absent such a federal rule, each State could afford patent-like
protection to particularly favored home industries, effectively insulating
them from competition outside the State. 97
In preempting the Florida statute, the Court explicitly viewed the statute as
leading to IP regulatory competition:
Given the substantial protection offered by the Florida scheme, we cannot
dismiss as hypothetical the possibility that it will become a significant
competitor to federal patent laws, offering investors similar protection
without the quid pro quo of substantial creative effort required by the
federal statute. The prospect of all 50 States establishing similar
protections for preferred industries without the rigorous requirements of
patentability prescribed by Congress could pose a substantial threat to the
patent system’s ability to accomplish its mission of promoting progress in
the useful arts.98
In the case of IO, the risk of regulation competition is likewise not some
hypothetical possibility. There is very real competition among the state and the federal
regulatory schemes. 99 For example, the Federal and Eighth Circuits100 have enforced
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mass market license terms preventing RE through interpretation of California and
Massachusetts state contract law. In addition, the Seventh Circuit ruling in ProCD v
Zeidenberg101 may be interpreted as opening the door to general enforceability of mass
market software license terms. In contrast, a reasoned application of either the “public
policy” exception to contract enforcement or the UCITA “fundamental public policy”
exception102 to contract enforcement adopted by Maryland and Virginia should lead a
court applying state law to invalidate a mass market restriction to the extent it prevented
discovery and use of IO.103 However, four state legislatures have adopted “bombshell”
legislation whereby the courts of that state will not apply UCITA rules in enforcing an
agreement against a resident of the state, even where a contract specifies that a UCITA
jurisdiction’s law applies to a contract.104
The net effect of this regulatory competition is that closed model technologists
may forego patent protection of IO or have information not meeting the requirements for
patentability and rely on state laws such as California and Massachusetts which have
been interpreted to favor enforcement of mass market contract terms prohibiting RE,
including choice and conflict of law rules.105
If ever there was an area where courts need to consider the risk of impermissible
regulatory competition of IP, the case of state protection of IO by enforcement of mass
market licenses may be it. With this background, a careful examination of the Supreme
Court patent preemption decisions is appropriate.
B.

Patent Preemption Test of Kewanee and Bonito Boats

Despite early doubt,106 it is now clear that software related inventions are
patentable. A search of the PTO database revealed a surprising number of recently issued
patents relating to compatibility features of computer hardware and software.107 Thus
interfaces, protocols and other formats may potentially be patented. For this reason, the
100
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potential patent preemption of a mass market contract term barring RE necessary to learn
secret IO must be addressed.
Although there has been some general discussion,108 no one has scrutinized the
reasoning which underpins the Supreme Court decisions on the topic to identify the
prospect for an “enlightened”109 patent preemption to mass market license restrictions on
RE undertaken solely for purposes of developing an interoperable program. In sum, the
Supreme Court has upheld trade secret protection because it “provides much weaker
protection” than patents110 yet preempted state law which effectively grants a producer of
a non-patented article “rights against the world.”111 In considering the issue, the freedom
to RE a publicly available product in the marketplace has been central to the Court’s
attention.
Kewanee112 remains the seminal case on the interplay between federal patent and
state trade secret laws. In Kewanee, plaintiff sued its former employees for
misappropriation of its trade secrets which had been protected by employment contract
terms imposing confidentiality on the employees. In reversing the Sixth Circuit’s ruling
that patent law preempted the trade secret claim, the Supreme Court undertook a detailed
analysis of the scope of Ohio trade secret law in comparison to federal patent law.
The Court’s analysis began with a summary of the Constitutional purpose behind
the patent and copyright clause and patent law:
The stated objective of the Constitution in granting the power to Congress
to legislate in the area of intellectual property is to “promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts.” The patent laws promote this progress by
108
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offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and
development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive
effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased
employment and better lives for our citizens. In return for the right of
exclusion-this “reward for inventions,”-the patent laws impose upon the
inventor a requirement of disclosure.113
The Court then proceeded to articulate the underlying policy of state trade secret
protection114:
The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of
invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law. “The necessity
of good faith and honest, fair dealing, is the very life and spirit of the commercial
world.”
In deciding that Ohio trade secret law was not preempted, the Court applied the
test of whether the “scheme of protection developed by Ohio respecting trade secrets
‘clashes with objectives of the federal patent laws.’”115 The Court reviewed Ohio trade
secret law which adopted the “widely relied-upon” trade secret definition from the
Restatement of Torts.116 That definition recognized that RE of a publicly available
product is a lawful way to discover secret information:
A trade secret law . . . does not offer protection against discovery by fair
and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure,
or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its
development or manufacture.117
The Kewanee Court reasoned that Ohio trade secret law was not preempted as a
general matter because it provided “far weaker protection in many respects than patent
law.”
Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the
patent law. While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the
trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse
engineering, patent law operates ‘against the world,’ forbidding any use of
the invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of time. The
holder of a trade secret also takes a substantial risk that the secret will be
113
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passed on to his competitors, by theft or by breach of a confidential
relationship, in a manner not easily susceptible of discovery or proof.
Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d, at 224. Where patent law acts as
a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve.118
The Supreme Court in Bonito Boats stressed that the Kewanee Court
determination that Ohio state trade secret law was weaker than patent law “was central to
the Court’s conclusion that trade secret protection did not conflict with either the
encouragement or disclosure policies of the federal patent law.”119
In addition, the Bonito Boats Court discussed at length the fundamental
importance of RE of publicly available products in considering whether patent law
preempts state law. In reaffirming Kewanee, the Court noted, “The public at large
remained free to discover and exploit the trade secret through reverse engineering of
products in the public domain. . . .”120
In contrast, the unavailability of RE under the Florida boat hull protection statute
was its fatal flaw (which was not saved by the alternative possibility of independent
creation):
That the Florida statute does not remove all means of reproduction and
sale does not eliminate conflict with the federal scheme. In essence, the
Florida law prohibits the entire public from engaging in a form of reverse
engineering of a product in the public domain. This is clearly one of the
rights vested in the federal patent holder, but has never been a part of state
protection under the law of unfair competition or trade secrets. See
Kewanee, (“A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection against
discovery by . . . so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the
known product and working backward to divine the process which aided
in its development or manufacture”); see also Chicago Lock Co. v.
Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982) (“A lock purchaser’s own
reverse-engineering of his own lock, and subsequent publication of the
serial number-key code correlation, is an example of the independent
invention and reverse engineering expressly allowed by trade secret
doctrine”). The duplication of boat hulls and their component parts may
be an essential part of innovation in the field of hydrodynamic design.
Variations as to size and combination of various elements may lead to
significant advances in the field. Reverse engineering of chemical and
mechanical articles in the public domain often leads to significant
advances in technology. If Florida may prohibit this particular method of
study and recomposition of an unpatented article, we fail to see the
principle that would prohibit a State from banning the use of
118
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chromatography in the reconstitution of unpatented chemical compounds,
or the use of robotics in the duplication of machinery in the public domain.
Moreover, as we noted in Kewanee, the competitive reality of reverse
engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an incentive to
develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability.121
The Bonito Boat reference to Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg122 is particularly
significant because the Ninth Circuit reasoned that use of state law to imply an obligation
against the public not to RE a publicly available product would be subject to patent
preemption.123
In Chicago Lock, the plaintiff Chicago Lock did not publish information about the
key codes for its Ace locks—the information necessary to make keys that would interface
with the locks. By virtue of maintaining the secrecy of the key codes, plaintiff sought to
preclude parties from making the keys necessary to operate the locks and thereby
maintain control of the market for replacement keys. The defendant locksmiths solicited
key codes for plaintiff’s locks from other locksmiths who had disassembled the plaintiff’s
locks124 and compiled those key codes in a two-volume publication.
The plaintiff sued defendants claiming that their misappropriation of trade secrets
constituted an unfair business practice. The district court ruled in plaintiff’s favor. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that California trade secret law permitted RE of the
purchased locks to discover the key codes. In addition, the Court held that if California
law were interpreted to impose on the purchasers of the locks an implied obligation not to
RE, it would be contrary to California trade secrets law and preempted by patent law:
Imposing an obligation of nondisclosure on lock owners here would
frustrate the intent of California courts to disallow protection to trade
secrets discovered through “fair and honest means.” . . . Further, such
an implied obligation upon the lock owners in this case would, in effect,
convert the Company’s trade secret into a state-conferred monopoly akin
to the absolute protection that a federal patent affords. Such an extension
of California trade secrets law would certainly be preempted by the federal
scheme of patent regulation.125
Chicago Lock makes clear that patent preemption must be considered where state law is
construed to override the general freedom to RE a product available in the marketplace.
Chicago Lock is also interesting because arguably there were public policy reasons based
on physical security to enforce a RE prohibition, yet the court did not consider this. 126
121
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Although one might try to distinguish Chicago Lock because it did not involve
use of contract law to protect a trade secret, the mere fact that a contract is involved does
not save it from the risk of patent preemption. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins127, the Supreme
Court refused to apply licensee estoppel and thereby enforce a negotiated license term
preventing the licensee from challenging the validity of a patent on an idea which was the
subject of the license.128 The Court recognized that, “[a]t the core of this case, then, is
the difficult question whether federal patent policy bars a State from enforcing a contract
regulating access to an unpatented secret idea.”129 Yet the Court held that enforcement of
a negotiated license may, under certain instances, be preempted by patent law. The
fundamental teaching of Lear is that contract law cannot be enforced where it may lead to
monopoly protection of functional information which does not meet the patent law
requirements of novelty and nonobviousness which are necessary to merit a patent.
What is significant in the combined teachings of these cases is the Supreme
Court’s reliance on three factors in concluding that state trade secret law protection was
not preempted by patent law because it was “weaker protection”: (1) RE is a “fair and
honest means” of discovery of a trade secret; (2) trade secrets are enforceable by breach
of a relationship, and do not operate “against the world”;130 and (3) trade secret
misappropriation is “not easily susceptible of discovery or proof.”
In addition, Kewanee and Bonito Boats teach that two additional factors may
come into play in deciding whether patent law preempts state law concerning IP. First,
courts should consider whether Congress has given any “affirmative indication” whether
state law is “consistent with federal policy.”131 Second, courts should consider whether
parallel between physical security and copyright, data and other digital world security issues in the case of
computer IO raises a question of whether the latter are so important that RE should be circumscribed. In
effect, Congress considered this issue when enacting section 1201and the very narrow RE exception of
section 1201(f) in two ways: (1) nothing in section 1201(f) entitles the lawful reverse engineer the right to
publish (as contrasted with use) IO (thus limiting Chicago Lock to use not disclosure); and (2) the risk of
misuse of security IO by third parties may be controlled by enforcing a restrictive contract against
outsourcing RE to discover IO. See discussion supra Part IV.B).
127
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there is a real or hypothetical risk that the policies which underlie federal law will be
jeopardized by state regulatory competition providing equivalent IP in the federal
system.132
C.

Patent Preemption of Mass Market License Restrictions on
Discovery and Use of Interoperability Information

Careful application of all five of the Kewanee and Bonito Boat patent preemption
factors to the case of mass market contract restrictions on RE for purposes of developing
an interoperable product strongly suggests that patent preemption is required.
First, if a mass market license restricts RE, then the traditional and fundamental
trade secret rule that a product may be reverse engineered to ascertain secrets is not met
because the only way to obtain the software is with the license.133 Yet the ability to
acquire the product in which inheres the secrets without a contract restriction underlies
the Court’s reasoning in Kewanee and Bonito Boats.
For example, in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 134 cited with approval in
Kewanee,135 the licensee of the trade secret had the alternative of acquiring the product in
the marketplace without any RE restriction. Judge Friendly, writing for the Second
Circuit, enforced a negotiated trade secret license. In doing so, he noted how a license
agreement is different from the rights covered by patent law because a license does not
operate against the world, but rather just the licensee:
An agreement licensing a trade secret is an altogether different matter. It
binds no one except the licensee; all others are free, as the licensee
previously was, to attempt by fair means to figure out what the secret is
and, if they succeed, to practice it.(n.5)136
In footnote five, Judge Friendly highlighted that the licensee, without being subject to a
license, was free to acquire the product on the market and RE it:
As Bourns [the trade secret claimant] suggests, there was nothing to
prevent Painton, before it entered into the agreement, or anyone else, from
prying open the unpatented Bourns potentiometers, ascertaining the
arrangement of the parts, and copying this. 137
Most directly on point is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chicago Lock,138 quoted
with approval in Bonito Boats.139 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
132

See discussion supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.B.
134
442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
135
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
136
Painton, 442 F.2d at 223.
137
Id. at 223 n.5.
138
See Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982).
139
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
133

29

patent preemption would apply if California trade secret law imposed an obligation
against the public which precluded RE of the key codes needed to operate plaintiff’s
locks. Enforcement under state contract law of a mass market term restricting RE for
interoperability purposes is just a different means of using state law to bar RE for
interoperability. It is hard to see why a court implied obligation should be at greater risk
of patent preemption than a mass market, non-negotiated, contract term with the same
effect.
Second, if a mass market license restriction is enforced, the only way to obtain the
software in which inheres the interface information is by virtue of a non-negotiated mass
market license which now also inheres as part of the software code.140 The very nature of
enforcement in the mass market context transforms what had been an in personam right
effectively into a right “against the world.”141 Professor Lemley aptly captured this
problem in considering proposed UCC 2B:
Because of this shift [to general enforcement of mass market licenses],
contracts under Article 2B are really more akin to property rights: the
contracts can be viewed as equitable servitudes that “run with” the goods
in much the same way that some property owners once tried to impose
restrictions on chattel. This shift is extremely important. The existing
relationship between intellectual property and contract law is based on a
conception of what constitutes an enforceable contract. Article 2B
changes that conception; as a result, it cannot help but change the
relationship as well. 142
The Drafters of UCITA recognized the potential effect of a non-negotiated mass
market license on the fundamental freedom to RE embodied in state trade secret law by
identifying it as a potential candidate for application of the fundamental public policy
grounds for invalidating such a restriction where it precludes use of IO.143
As discussed infra at Part IV A, the Federal Circuit Courts have consistently
rejected copyright claims to prohibit RE by decompilation and disassembly of software to
bar discovery and use of IO because copyright enforcement would be tantamount to
creation of a “de facto monopoly” resulting in “patent-like protection”. Likewise,
Chicago Lock reasons that an implied trade secrecy obligation preventing disassembly to
obtain interoperation information impermissibly “converts . . . a trade secret into a stateconferred monopoly akin to the absolute protection that a patent affords.”
An enforceable shrink-wrap or web wrap term running with distribution of
publicly available software (because the license is now part of the software) has the same
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practical effect.144 If use of copyright law or trade secret law (Chicago Lock) to prevent
use of IO conflicts with patent law, use of state contract law to acquire “patent-like
protection” would equally conflict with and frustrate the purposes and objects of patent
law.145 In addition, since mass market contracts typically include choice of law
provisions, the geographical scope of the patent-like protection is nation-wide, and thus is
more troubling than the Florida-only reach of the statute in Bonito Boats.146
For these reasons, a mass market shrink or web wrap license bears absolutely no
resemblance to the two-party negotiated contracts that the Kewanee and Painton courts
were contemplating when they held that trade secret law was “much weaker” than patent
law.
Third, enforcement of RE clauses against a party seeking to discover IO results in
the detection paradox discussed in Part II C above. The detection paradox is that a party
who reverse engineers to learn interface secrets to develop an interoperable program is
more likely to be detected than a party who reverse engineers solely to clone a product.
Once the interoperable product is introduced into the market, the fact that it can
interoperate with the original product is a red flag for detection. Yet Kewanee makes
clear that one reason trade secret law is weaker is because trade secret misappropriation is
“not easily susceptible of discovery or proof.”147 But that is not the case with IO, where
the interoperability feature of the interoperable program enables easy detection. Thus,
sieve-like potential for leakage of secret IO is sealed to a large extent due to ready
detection in the marketplace.148
Fourth, Congress has indicated in section 1201(f) of the DMCA a federal policy
supporting RE to discover and use IO.149 This is the type of “affirmative action” by
Congress that the Supreme Court has indicated is relevant in finding the appropriate
balance between federal patent and copyright law and permissible state protection of
trade secrets.150
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Fifth, there is competition in regulation of IO by virtue of the recent rulings of the
Eighth, and Federal Circuits applying California and Massachusetts law and risk of
similar rulings by misapplication of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in ProCD.151
In sum, applying the Kewanee and Bonito Boats patent preemption factors to
mass market license restrictions on RE for interoperability purposes strongly suggests
that patent law should preempt contract law when it is merely an instrument to try to
patentize trade secret information.152 In trying to draw a reasonable line between the
policy of freedom of contract to prevent free riding by cloning trade secrets153 and the
competing interests in competition and interoperability, limiting patent preemption or
state public policy invalidation to the narrow case of terms preventing RE for
interoperability best balances the competing interests, and is consistent with recent
Congressional intent reflected in Section 1201(f) of the DMCA.154
Only one case has even peripherally touched upon this issue. In DVD Copy
Control Ass’n v. Bunner,155 the Supreme Court of California reversed a Court of Appeal
ruling that dissolved a preliminary injunction against website operators who had
allegedly trade secret material which would enable decrypting DVD copy control on their
sites or linked to other sites with such information. In remanding the case, the California
Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeal had to “’make an independent examination
of the entire record’ and determine whether the evidence in the record supports the
factual findings necessary to establish that the preliminary injunction was warranted
under California’s trade secret law.”156 The majority assumed but did not decide that the
initial acquisition of the secret IO by Jan Johansen violated the plaintiff’s shrinkwrap
license.157
In a concurring opinion, Justice Moreno agreed that the Court of Appeal needed
“to clarify how the prior restraint doctrine under the First Amendment applies to the
publication of alleged trade secrets.”158 However, Justice Moreno also ruled that there
was no need for further proceedings because the plaintiff’s trade secret claim was
“patently without merit”159 because the information was no longer still secret. In addition,
he noted in a final footnote that the information was likely acquired through proper
means by RE the software:
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I also note that it is highly doubtful the alleged trade secret was acquired
by improper means within the meaning of the trade secret law. Civil Code
section 3426.1, subdivision (a), defining "improper means," states
"[r]everse engineering ... alone shall not be considered
improper means." Apparently the word "alone" refers to the fact that the
item reverse engineered would have to be obtained "by a fair and honest
means, such as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse
engineering to be lawful." (Legis. Com. Com., 12A pt. 1 West's Ann.
Civ.Code, supra, foll. Civ.Code, § 3426.1, p. 238, quoting Rest. Torts §
757, com. (f).) According to the allegations of the complaint, the alleged
initial misappropriator of CSS, Jon Johannsen, acquired the secret through
reverse engineering. There is no allegation that he acquired the product
containing CSS unlawfully, and that therefore improper means were
employed. The DVD CCA argument below that violation of a "click
license" agreement prohibiting reverse engineering constituted the
improper means does not appear to have merit. To be sure, contract plays
an important role in trade secret law by protecting the trade secret holder
against "unauthorized use or disclosure through a contract with the
recipient of a disclosure " or others who have had special access to trade
secret information, via confidentiality agreements and the like. (Rest.3d
Unfair Competition, § 41, com. d, p. 471, italics added.) But nowhere has
it been recognized that a party wishing to protect proprietary information
may employ a consumer form contract to, in effect, change the statutory
definition of "improper means" under trade secret law to include reverse
engineering, so that an alleged trade secret holder may bring an action
even against a nonparty to that contract. Moreover, if trade secret law did
allow alleged trade secret holders to redefine "improper means" to include
reverse engineering, it would likely be preempted by federal patent law,
which alone grants universal protection for a limited time against the right
to reverse engineer. (See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.
(1989) 489 U.S. 141, 155, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103 L.Ed.2d 118.)160
Other than this discussion in a footnote in a concurring decision, to date there
have only been broad based arguments by commentators about patent preemption for
mass market license RE restrictions. Over a decade ago, Professor Rice relied upon the
second Kewanee factor—that trade secrets do not operate “against the world”-- to argue
that all mass market license restrictions on RE of software should be preempted by patent
law:
Shrink-wrap license prohibitions against reverse engineering alter the
operation of those [trade secret] liability rules and the public policies
which they reflect in a manner that accomplishes exclusion that
substantially enhances trade secret law, making it more like patent law
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without the disclosure requirement and temporal limit of federal law. It is
that effect which poses the prospect of patent law preemption.161
Professor Lemley also raised the specter of patent preemption, yet ultimately
found it unsatisfying because “[p]atent [p]reemption [l]acks [n]uance.” 162 Professor
Reichman and Jonathan Franklin noted in passing that “[i]n an ideal world, perhaps, an
enlightened preemption doctrine might ask the right questions”, but then quickly rejected
it as politically impractical and too “wooden” a doctrinal tool.163
However, a careful reading of Judge Friendly’s opinion in Painton suggests that
courts can apply patent preemption to portions of mass market license clauses in a
nuanced and enlightened way. Judge Friendly recognized in dicta that were patent
preemption to apply with respect to an agreement, a court “might be willing to recognize
aspects of the agreement less offensive to the policy of the patent laws. . . .” Accordingly,
a court might utilize a time honored approach of blue penciling a contract clause to avoid
only that which is contrary to patent law.164 Even Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in ProCD
leaves open the prospect that a particular contract case might necessitate application of
preemption.165
To avoid any misunderstanding it is critical to highlight how circumscribed patent
preemption of contract law would be under this analysis. First, negotiated contracts
would be unaffected. Second, only to the extent a non-negotiated mass market clause is
interpreted to bar discovery and use of IO might it be preempted.166 Thus, a court would
preempt a clause insofar as it extended to discovery and use of IO, yet otherwise enforce
the clause.167 To highlight why this approach makes sense a comparison of two licenses
is appropriate: (1) a license of IO for a limited purpose and subject to an obligation of
secrecy; and (2) a non-negotiated mass market license of object code software subject to
a prohibition against RE to learn IO solely to develop an independent program
interoperable with the licensed program.
161
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Nothing in the application of the Kewanee and Bonito Boats factors raises doubts
as to the enforceability of a license of secret IO. In such a case the subject of the license
would be the information, not the software product (as in example 2). Thus enforcement
of license 1 would not run afoul of the proposed patent preemption analysis168 but would
in fact further the permissible state policy of encouraging controlled dissemination of
information by licensing of trade secrets recognized in Kewanee.169 A competitor would
remain free to RE the software for interoperability purposes. Thus, there is no risk of
creation of a property right against the world in such information. In contrast the
restriction in license 2 goes to the heart of the concerns about patent law discussed above
and would frustrate the patent regime. As such, enforcement by state courts should be
preempted.
In addition, the Supreme Court’s reasoning would support enforcement of a
shrink- or web-wrap term prohibiting RE extending to IO during product development.170
In preempting the Florida statute, the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats noted that trade
secret protection is most important during the product development stage, rather than
after the product enters the market:
The Florida statute substantially reduces this competitive incentive
[available via reverse engineering], thus eroding the general rule of free
competition upon which the attractiveness of the federal patent bargain
depends. The protections of state trade secret law are most effective at the
developmental stage, before a product has been marketed and the threat of
reverse engineering becomes real.171
Thus, even non-negotiated licenses accompanying limited distribution of an alpha,
beta or other pre-market launch test versions of software could contain an enforceable
term prohibiting access to IO. The reasons are clear: (1) the length of the restriction is
almost certain to be much shorter than the patent term; and (2) the restriction does not
conflict with the fundamental trade secret limiting principle of freedom to RE a product
generally available in the marketplace.172
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One issue is whether patent preemption should apply to IO which is not in fact
patentable. The Kewanee Court specifically considered and rejected a “partial
preemption” approach because it would “impose the almost impossible burden on state
courts to determine the patentability-in-fact of an invention.”173
In view of the above arguments, it seems curious that no court has directly
considered this patent preemption analysis. One is left wondering why the recent debate
among commentators, litigants, and the courts has been limited primarily to copyright
preemption of contract law. In retrospect, perhaps the reason for the focus on copyright
and contract was due to uncertainty over the availability patent protection for computer
software.174 However, with that issue now resolved in the affirmative, it seems clear that
the focus should shift.
Given the availability of patent protection for interoperability related aspects of
software, a fresh read of Kewanee, Bonito Boats and the other patent preemption cases
discussed above provides a sufficiently nuanced, enlightened, and pragmatic approach
which would invoke patent preemption of RE prohibitions only to the extent that they bar
discovery of IO. Applying this new lens to extant cases shows how analysis and
outcomes may be affected.
D.

Applying Patent Preemption Lens to Recent Decisions: Bowers,
Davidson, ProCD

Changing the lens from the current copyright/contract preemption debate to a
focus on the interplay of patent, trade secret policy, and contract law as an instrument for
protecting trade secrets provides a new way for courts to consider the matter. In sum, the
appropriate hierarchy for protection of IO is patent primacy, with weaker trade secret
protection, including use of contract law as an instrument of that weaker protection. But
where enforcement of a particular term would result in stronger state protection than the
federal patent regime, the term must be preempted.175 Such is the case of non-negotiated
mass market licenses restricting discovery and use of IO.
The proper approach for courts is first to determine if a reasonable interpretation
avoids the clash of policies. As such, courts may simply interpret narrowly terms
restricting RE solely to cover activity directed at discovering secrets to clone features (as
contrasted with activity to learn interfaces for interoperability purposes), in light of the
underlying competing federal and state trade secret policy considerations which
173
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potentially conflict with contract law. If such interpretation is not feasible,176 then the
contract law exception for competing public policy analysis should be employed. 177 It is
only as a last resort that courts should address the patent preemption.
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.178 presents a case where a copyright
preemption/contract focus has left ambiguities on the question of whether a mass market
term can bar RE to discover and use IO.
In Bowers, the Federal Circuit enforced a mass market restriction on RE
notwithstanding a claim of copyright preemption. Factually, it appears to be a case of
cloning.179 The defendant reverse engineered the plaintiff’s product to copy its
functionality, but there is no reference to any IO. In ruling that the shrink wrap license
term restricting RE was not preempted by copyright, the court held that there was an
extra element in the contract beyond what copyright covered—that extra element was the
contract-created duty not to discover and use the uncopyrightable trade secret ideas which
inhered in the software.
In adopting the reasoning of ProCD and enforcing the contract, the court’s
decision sheds minimal light on a case involving IO. Arguably, the court reserved
judgment:
In making this determination, this court has left untouched the conclusions
reached in Atari Games v. Nintendo regarding reverse engineering as a
statutory fair use exception to copyright infringement. Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 24 USPQ 1015 (Fed. Cir.
1992). In Atari, this court stated that, with respect to 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair
use section of the Copyright Act), “[t]he legislative history of section 107
suggests that courts should adapt the fair use exception to accommodate
new technological innovations.” Atari, 975 F.2d at 843. This court noted
“[a] prohibition on all copying whatsoever would stifle the free flow of
ideas without serving any legitimate interest of the copyright holder.” Id.
Therefore, this court held “reverse engineering object code to discern the
unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair use.” Id. Application
of the First Circuit’s view distinguishing a state law contract claim having
176
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additional elements of proof from a copyright claim does not alter the
findings of Atari. Likewise, this claim distinction does not conflict with
the expressly defined circumstances in which reverse engineering is not
copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (section of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act) and 17 U.S.C. § 906 (section directed to mask
works).180
The Federal Circuit’s discussion of the distinction between copyright and use of contract
law to prevent misappropriation of trade secrets may be all that the court intended by
stating that it was not altering the copyright decision in Atari. However, the reference to
section 1201(f) of the DMCA may be more telling because that section expresses
Congressional intent to override contract in certain cases involving RE to discover and
use IO.181 Read from this perspective, the court’s statement that the “claim distinction
[between contract and copyright] does not conflict with the expressly defined
circumstances in which RE is no copyright infringement under [1201(f)]” may be the
court’s way of expressly recognizing that RE for purposes of interoperability was not
being considered.
In interpreting the specific clause, the Bowers court stated:
In this case, the contract unambiguously prohibits “reverse engineering.”
That term means ordinarily “to study or analyze (a device, as a microchip
for computers) in order to learn details of design, construction, and
operation, perhaps to produce a copy or an improved version.” Thus, the
contract in this case broadly prohibits any “reverse engineering” of the
subject matter covered by the shrink-wrap agreement.182
The court went on to state, “The shrink-wrap license agreement prohibited, inter alia, all
reverse engineering of Mr. Bowers’ software, protection encompassing but more
extensive than copyright protection, which prohibits only certain copying.”183
There are two ways to interpret the court’s reasoning. One is that the court
enforced a contract to prevent RE to discover all ideas unprotectable by copyright, which
would include IO. A second reading is simply that a mass market license is enforceable
to prevent RE of trade secrets which inhere in software other than IO (i.e., to prevent
cloning functionality generally).
It is unfortunate that the court’s use of the phrase “all reverse engineering”
arguably comports better with the former view which would preclude discovery and use
of IO—an interpretation in conflict with the patent preemption analysis outline above.
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Had the court been presented with the issue from the patent preemption/trade
secret perspective suggested in this article, it very well may have provided greater
attention to its interpretation of the contract clause and explicitly construed it to exclude
IO to avoid a patent preemption risk. Nonetheless, the issue was not before the court and
the finding of breach of an enforceable contract term is consistent with the analysis
suggested in this article (i.e. that courts should enforce mass market prohibitions on RE
for purposes of cloning functionality generally).
Interestingly, Judge Dyk’s dissent captures the key distinction between
individually negotiated terms and those subsumed in a mass market license but which
may be at odds with other policies184: "I nonetheless agree with the majority opinion that
a state can permit parties to contract away a fair use defense or to agree not to engage in
uses of copyrighted material that are permitted by the copyright law, if the contract is
freely negotiated." Unfortunately Judge Dyk limited his disagreement solely to the
debate of balancing federal copyright policy vis a vis state contract policy (which
includes use of contract as an instrument to enforce a trade secret). As such, the opinion
did not address the critical issue of considering either federal patent law or other public
policies to determine the appropriate scope of state trade secrets rights and their
enforcement by contract law.
In sum, Bowers is worth reconsidering from this new perspective. Ironically, the
court’s focus on federal copyright policy vis a vis state freedom of contract policy may be
due to defendant’s failure to plead patent preemption. For whatever reason, there is no
discussion of the critical issue of whether enforcing a RE prohibition clause in a mass
market context upsets the fundamental trade secret principle concerning RE products in
the marketplace and impermissibly conflicts with patent law.185 Since the case did not
involve IO, it is distinguishable on its facts.
Davidson186 is yet another case stuck in the copyright/freedom of contract rut.
Once again, as in Bowers, the focus on copyright theories (preemption, misuse) may stem
from a failure to recognize the key role of patent law. Ironically, this focus by the court
again may simply be due to defendant’s failure to plead patent preemption as a
defense.187
In Davidson, the defendants asserted that they reverse engineered solely to
discover protocols and other format information needed to build server software which
would interoperate with Davidson’s software. However, the record is unclear if
defendants discovered and used any other secret information beyond that which was
184
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needed for interoperability.188 If the defendants’ and plaintiff’s products were
functionally similar, but that occurred from external intelligent observation by
defendants, then there would not appear to be any basis for claiming contract breach (i.e.
misappropriation of a trade secret) solely due to defendants’ RE of plaintiff’s software to
discover IO.189
The point is that patent, copyright, and trade secret law and policy support
overriding a non-negotiated mass market restriction to the extent the defendants obtained
and used only IO. If the contract term was enforced to prevent use of such information,
then the fundamental balance between the incentives available under the limited term and
scope of patent law would potentially be outweighed by the reward offered by state
enforcement of the clause: a “de facto monopoly” of potentially perpetual duration to
exclude others from discovering IO whose use in an interoperable product is readily
detectable in the marketplace because of its compatibility feature.
However, if discovery and use of Davidson’s secrets extended beyond the narrow
field of functional IO which strikes at the core of federal patent and copyright law,
defendants were properly held accountable to the contract restriction.
Finally, ProCD must be considered since it is so broadly cited for the general
proposition that mass market license terms are enforceable. At the outset, the rule
adopted in ProCD is worth stating: “Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their
terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they
violate a rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable).”190 At a minimum, the case
is not directly on point since the defendant was not seeking to RE the software to
discover and use IO.191 As such, it was not a case which necessarily implicated patent
preemption. In addition, the recognition that “general” grounds of exception to contract
enforcement are applicable to shrink-wrap licenses expressly reserves the prospect that a
public policy192 or patent preemption could apply in a future case. In fact, Judge
Easterbrook very carefully made clear that a situation could be presented where
preemption might apply to a private contract:
Like the Supreme Court in Wolens, we think it prudent to refrain from
adopting a rule that anything with the label “contract” is necessarily
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outside the preemption clause: the variations are too numerous to
foresee.193
The challenge with ProCD is that a careful analysis of Judge Easterbrook’s
reasoning and dicta highlights questions on the issue of whether a shrink-wrap license is
enforceable “against the world” as contemplated by the Kewanee and Bonito Boat
decisions in the context of a non-negotiated mass market license restriction on RE to
discover and use IO in 2006. In addition there is language suggesting that a RE
prohibition is consistent with trade secret law.194 Since the language is merely dicta,
there is nothing to prevent reconsideration of these issues in a case which directly raises
the issue of enforcement of a mass-market clause which bars discovery and use of IO to
preclude development of an independent interoperable product.
The central assumption implicit in Judge’s Easterbrook’s conclusion that the
ProCD shrink-wrap was not a public right enforceable “against the world” but rather a
private contract right was that one can actually find software available on the street
without an enforceable contract term. Thus he reasons:
Rights ‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright’ are rights established by law—rights that restrict the options
of persons who are strangers to the author. Copyright law forbids
duplication, public performance, and so on, unless the person wishing to
copy or perform the work gets permission; silence means a ban on
copying. A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast,
generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so
contracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’ Someone who found a copy of
[plaintiff’s software product which included telephone listings] on the
street would not be affected by the shrink-wrap license—though the
federal copyright laws of their own force would limit the finder’s ability to
copy or transmit the application program.195
Several points are worth noting about this analysis as applied to patent preemption
of a term preventing RE to discover and use IO. Amazingly, they all stem from the
assumption that “strangers … who [find] . . . cop[ies] of [software] on the street would
not be affected by the shrink-wrap license.”
The reason the “strangers on the street” assumption is so critical is that whether
such “strangers” are real or fictional in 2006 lies at the heart of the reasoning in Kewanee
and Bonito Boats.196 First, the freedom to RE a product available in the marketplace
without being subject to a contract restriction—the first Kewanee factor—is satisfied in
193
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the case of software by ProCD’s “strangers on the street”. Second, Kewanee made clear
that if a state law is enforceable “against the world” it may be at risk of patent
preemption. It is only by existence of the “strangers on the street” that the shrink-wrap
license in ProCD is not enforceable against the world.
Thus to satisfy two of the Kewanee factors the existence of “strangers on the
street” who are free of any contract restriction are critical. The problem with software is
that ProCD’s “strangers on the street” have become, in the real world of software
distribution in 2006—virtual, not real, strangers. This is due to the dramatic changes in
the way in which software is now typically made available to the public. The copy of the
ProCD software which is assumed to be available to “strangers on the street” is a relic of
a now outmoded approach to distribution of software. No one merely includes a sheet of
paper printed with the license in a box which separately contains a disk on which resides
the object code version of the software. Today, even in the case of tangible copies of
software available for distribution (and thus theoretically available for strangers to pick
up on the street) the software itself typically includes the license.197 In the increasingly
common context of web distribution, the license is part of the software and affirmative
assent by electronic keystroke to the terms is a prerequisite to access to the software.198
In addition, the new claim under section 1202 of the DMCA for altering copyright
management information creates a separate cause of action against anyone who attempts
to strip the license terms from the software.199 The point is in the increasingly prevalent
era of digital availability via the internet, the license is part of the code and the federal
law of Section 1202 bars its separation. As such, ProCD’s “strangers” have become
entirely fictional because no one can practically gain access to software without
encountering the license.
Finally, since no issue of patent preemption was raised, Judge Easterbrook’s
passing comments in ProCD about Kewanee are just that—dicta. The case did not
require scrutiny of the Kewanee and Bonito Boats factors to determine whether a state
contract term might result in a “de facto monopoly” right equivalent to or stronger than a
patent.200 It is for this reason that his dictum about the “procompetitive functions” of a
shrink wrap RE prohibition on software should not be misinterpreted. He was not
presented with an argument that such a clause was extending to IO as contrasted with
other trade secret source code information. Had that been the case, then reliance on
Kewanee and Bonito Boats would have presented the case which he hypothesized—i.e., a
“variation[] or possibilit[y] [the court could not] foresee” that might lead to
preemption.201
In sum, the holding of ProCD is not inconsistent with the patent preemption and
public policy analysis presented in this article. In addition and more importantly, the
reasoning of ProCD is not helpful in analyzing some of the issues presented in this article
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for two reasons. First, the fundamental assumption in ProCD concerning the manner in
which software is made available to the public no longer reflects marketplace reality in
2006 because software is not typically available distinct from its license.202 Second,
since ProCD solely raised copyright preemption—which this author suggests is
inapposite to the question of contractual control of discovery and use of IO--dicta on
Kewanee and Bonito Boat in ProCD understandably do not reflect the detailed teachings
of those cases in the case of patent preemption.
Interestingly, the patent preemption analysis suggested in this Article may provide
a reasoned approach to ProCD and the broader issue of the bounds imposed by federal
intellectual property law on use of contract (or some other form of state regulation) to
control access to and use of useful data. Arguably, the question is dependent upon the
patent preemption factors outlined in Part III C: (1) whether state regulation results in a
de facto patent-like monopoly in such data, (2) whether there is impermissible regulatory
competition in IP for functional data in the federal system, and (3) whether Congress has
expressed any intent in terms of the role of federal vs state regulation of such useful
information. 203 If enforcement of the contract term is tantamount to a patent-like
monopoly, and there is a real risk of regulatory competition, then the risk of patent
preemption is great. Since there were other sources of the uncopyrightable data
compilation in ProCD, there was no risk that enforcement of the contract was tantamount
to a state monopoly in the data. This approach is also consistent with the underlying
reasoning of Judge Posner in Assessment Technologies v. WireDATA, Inc.204 where he
strongly suggested that use of a mass market software license to effectively control
access to and use of public domain data very well might be copyright misuse because it
could effect monopoly type control over the data.
Unfortunately, one reading of Bowers, Davidson and ProCD may lead some to
conclude – erroneously in this author’s opinion--that mass market license terms
restricting RE to discover and use IO are enforceable and consistent with federal policy.
For the reasons discussed above, this conclusion is solely because courts have undertaken
a copyright, rather than patent and state trade secret, policy and preemption analysis.
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The unfortunate result is an apparent realignment of public policy in favor of a
technology distributor who elects to introduce its technology to the mass market under a
license. It enables the technologist, without any federal IP rights in its IO, to assert
exclusivity “against the world” to that information. This would appear to lie at the heart
of the patent regime.
As discussed below, recent copyright decisions unequivocally reflect that patent
law has primacy in the area of control of IO. In addition, recent Congressional action in
amending the Copyright Act expresses a federal policy in favor of RE of technical
protections of copyrighted works where necessary to develop an independent
interoperable product. Cumulatively, these teachings indicate that recent cases have too
readily enforced mass market license terms prohibiting RE, regardless of purpose. This
is inconsistent with repeated cautions from the Supreme Court to be mindful that patent is
the proper form of IP for useful inventions.205
Part IV: Federal Copyright Law on Discovery and Use of Interoperability
Information
A.

Fair Use Decisions and the Primacy of Patent Law

Recent copyright fair use decisions support RE for interoperability.206 Copyright
decisions have recognized that RE of software to learn necessary interface information to
develop independent programs which can interoperate with the targeted software or with
another product that is compatible with the closed technologist’s product is fair use.207
Thus courts have held that copying of interface information—whether directly used by
end users208 or indirectly by allowing a program to interoperate with another program209-is defensible and may excuse intermediate infringement of a software program. The
underlying rationale is that copyright does not protect ideas, processes, data formats and
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methods of operation210 and as such it is fair for a competitor to do an act that would
otherwise be copyright infringement (decompiling or disassembling a software program)
to ascertain the IO needed to build an independent interoperable program.211
The outcome in these cases relating to access and use of IO is consistent with the
fundamental teaching of Baker v. Selden212: although a party can acquire a copyright in a
work which embodies creative expression, that right cannot interfere with the right to
practice the useful art or method of operation embodied in the work which is the province
of patent law. Thus in Baker, the Supreme Court determined that copyright would not
extend to foreclose use of a form embodied in a copyright work necessary to practice a
bookkeeping method. The Court reasoned that the ability to control the practice of a
method of operation was the province of patent, not copyright:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made,
would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of
letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention or discovery of
an art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent
Office before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be
secured by a patent from the government.213
A review of the key copyright cases involving RE to discover and use IO shows
consistent support for this principle. This underlying tenet of the primary place of the
regime of patent, not copyright, in connection with the right to use functional matter
(such as a format—the software equivalent to the form in Baker) should inform the
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analysis of whether patent or copyright principles should govern the question of
preemption of state contract terms which bar discovery and use of IO.214
Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc.215 was the first case to hold that RE of software to
discover and use IO is a fair use. The Ninth Circuit held that Accolade’s disassembly of
Sega’s machine readable object code (which was publicly available) into human-readable
source code was permissible to identify the information necessary for Accolade to
develop an independent game program that would be compatible with the Sega Genesis
game platform.
In order to discover the interface information, Accolade copied and made a
derivative of the Sega object code, both of which acts prima facie fall within the
exclusive rights of a copyright holder. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Accolade’s disassembly was a fair use under Section 107 of the Copyright Act:
Because, in the case before us, disassembly is the only means of gaining
access to those unprotected aspects of the program, and because Accolade
has a legitimate interest in gaining such access (in order to determine how
to make its cartridges compatible with the Genesis console), we agree with
Accolade’s [fair use assertion].216
The Sega court recognized that a contrary ruling would amount to an
unacceptable “de facto monopoly” on IO by reliance on copyright law:
[T]he fact that computer programs are distributed for public use in object
code form often precludes public access to the ideas and functional
concepts contained in those programs, and thus confers on the copyright
owner a de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional concepts. That
result defeats the fundamental purpose of the Copyright Act – to
encourage the production of original works by protecting the expressive
elements of those works while leaving the ideas, facts, and functional
concepts in the public domain for others to build on. Feist Publications,
111 S. Ct. at 1290 ; see also Atari Games Corp., slip op. at 18-20 .217
A review of this reasoning suggests that the court’s logic is partially correct:
enforcing such a copyright claim would confer a “de facto monopoly over
[interoperabilty] ideas and functional concepts.” However, fundamentally it is the patent
primacy teaching of Baker (which underlies section 102(b) of the Copyright Act) which
dictates the outcome. Thus, it is inappropriate to assert copyright in a work to prevent
214
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another from practicing the useful art (i.e. the format or method for interoperation) by
barring discovery and use of that which inheres in the work.
Not surprisingly, in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,218 the
Federal Circuit—the court most acutely familiar with the exclusive role of patents to
address functional information219—found the attempted use of copyright law to bar
discovery of IO conflicted with the exclusive domain of patent law because it created
“patent-like protection”. Relying on Bonito Boats (discussed in detail in Part III above),
the Court stated:
To protect processes or methods of operation, a creator must look to the
patent laws. An author cannot acquire patent-like protection by putting an
idea, process or method of operation in an unintelligible form and
asserting copyright infringement against those who try to understand that
idea, process, or method of operation.220
The Second Circuit in Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai Inc.,221 specifically
addressed whether IO is protected by copyright by considering Baker v. Seldon222:
To the extent that an accounting text and a computer program are both "a
set of statements or instructions . . . to bring about a certain result," 17
U.S.C. Section 101, they are roughly analogous. In the former case, the
processes are ultimately conducted by human agency; in the latter, by
electronic means. In either case, as already stated, the
processes themselves are not protectable. But the holding in Baker goes
farther. The Court concluded that those aspects of a work, which "must
necessarily be used as incident to" the idea, system or process that the
work describes, are also not copyrightable. 101 U.S. at 104.
Selden's ledger sheets, therefore, enjoyed no copyright protection because
they were "necessary incidents to" the system of accounting that he
described. Id . at 103. From this reasoning, we conclude that those
elements of a computer program that are necessarily incidental to its
function are similarly unprotectable.223
The Altai Court then proceeded to outline the now well-accepted
abstraction/filtration/comparison test to determine non-literal infringement of the
structure of a computer program. The Court specifically identified “compatibility”
requirements as the type of elements dictated by external factors which should not be
protected by copyright and thus “filtered” out:
218
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b) Elements Dictated By External Factors
We have stated that where "it is virtually impossible to write about a
particular historical era or fictional theme without employing
certain 'stock' or standard literary devices," such expression is not
copyrightable. . . . This is known as the scenes a faire doctrine, and like
"merger," it has its analogous application to computer programs. . . .
Professor Nimmer points out that "in many instances it is
virtually impossible to write a program to perform particular functions in a
specific computing environment without employing standard
techniques." . . . This is a result of the fact that a programmer's freedom
of design choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such
as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular
program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other
programs with which a program is designated to operate in conjunction;
(3) computer manufacturers' design standards.224
In affirming the district court’s finding of no infringement, the Second Circuit
specifically applied the above compatibility constraint:
The district court also found that the overlap exhibited between the list of
services required for both ADAPTER [plaintiff’s program] and OSCAR
3.5 [defendant’s allegedly infringing program] was "determinated [sic]
by the demands of the operating system and of the applications program
to which it [was] to be linked through ADAPTER or OSCAR." Id. In
other words, this aspect of the program's structure was dictated by the
nature of other programs with which it was designed to interact and,
thus, is not protected by copyright.225
The Tenth Circuit decision in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus.,226 also
recognized the risk of extending copyright protection to prevent use of methods of
interoperation in a section of the opinion entitled, “The Process-Expression Dichotomy”:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs
should extend protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the
programmer, rather than merely to the “writing” expressing his ideas.
Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the
expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a
computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in
the program are not within the scope of copyright law.227
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The Court discussed Baker and recognized that “[c]ertain processes may be the subject of
patent law protection.”228 Presciently, the Tenth Circuit, in relying on Sega for the
proposition that “compatibility requirements” are excluded from copyright protection by
the scenes a faire doctrine, cautioned:
We recognize that the scenes a faire doctrine may implicate the
protectability of interfacing and that the topic is very sensitive and has the
potential to effect widely the law of computer copyright. This appeal does
not require us to determine the scope of scenes a faire doctrine as it relates
to interfacing and accordingly we refrain from discussing the issue.229
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit decision in Bates v. Mnemonics,230 is significant
because the court specifically identified patent and trade secret law, not copyright, as the
appropriate legal regimes for protection of IO. In rejecting a claim for copyright in a data
format needed for telecommunication interoperation, the Court stated:
In no case, however should copyright protection be extended to functional
results obtained when program instructions are executed and such results
are processes of the type better left to patent and trade secret protection.231
Collectively, these cases support the proposition that copyright cannot be asserted
to prevent RE to discover and use IO. However, none of them address whether a contract
term can override the right to RE to discover and use IO.
The Fifth Circuit has encountered the conflict between copyright and contract. In
Alcatel U.S.A., Inc. v. DGI Techs., 232 the court upheld a jury finding that a contractual
restriction on RE constituted copyright misuse.233 In an earlier appeal in this case, the
Fifth Circuit used the same reasoning as Sega and Atari concerning impropriety of
copyright assertion to obtain “a patent-like monopoly” without a patent to rule that
copyright misuse might bar enforcement of a license:
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DGI may well prevail on the defense of copyright misuse, because DSC
seems to be attempting to use its copyright to obtain a patent-like
monopoly over unpatented microprocessor cards. Any competing
microprocessor card developed for use on DSC phone switches must be
compatible with DSC's copyrighted operating system software. In order
to ensure that its card is compatible, a competitor such as DGI must test
the card on a DSC phone switch. Such a test necessarily involves making
a copy of DSC's copyrighted operating system, which copy is downloaded
into the card's memory when the card is booted up. If DSC is allowed to
prevent such copying, then it can prevent anyone from developing a
competing microprocessor card, even though it has not patented the card.
The defense of copyright misuse "forbids the use of the copyright to
secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the
Copyright Office," including a limited monopoly over microprocessor
cards. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977. Therefore, DGI's asserting the
misuse defense could cast substantial doubt on the predictability of
success by DSC. The First Circuit squarely came to this conclusion in
Lotus v. Borland, where it held that the keystroke commands for human
interoperating with the software was a method of operation within Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act and thus not copyrightable. 234
A broader understanding of these decisions demonstrates they are consistent with
the general principle to channel protection of subject matter between patent and copyright,
with the primacy of patent law for functional matters (i.e. useful arts).235 This is founded
in the Intellectual Property clause in the Constitution which makes clear that inventors
are incented with patents to promote progress in the useful arts and authors are incented
by copyright to promote writings and other artistic/creative expressions.236 The net result
is that patent law (not copyright law) has primacy in addressing protection of functional
subject matter such as formats and methods for interoperation of computer software.237
Arguably it is this teaching which was somehow lost in the recent cases where the
propriety of contract to control discovery and use of IO has been considered solely from a
mistaken focus on copyright law. Since IO is functional in nature, the proper
Constitutional focus should primarily be patent, not copyright, law. Thus, patent, not
copyright law, is the primary source of law at the federal level for protection of functional
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information.238 With this in mind, it becomes apparent that arguments about Copyright
preemption of state regulation by contract of IO are at most secondary considerations:
the appropriate question is whether state protection of IO by mass market license
prohibitions on RE clashes with the patent regime established under the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the above cases cumulatively reflect an underlying federal policy
supporting RE to enable the development of interoperable software even where there may
be potential adverse market effects on the original technologist. This same policy is
embodied in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
B.

Section 1201(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act

In 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).
Section 1201 of the DMCA establishes new causes of action against persons who either
circumvent a technological measure which protects a copyrighted work or manufacture,
import, offer to the public, or traffic in any technology or component that is primarily
designed to circumvent such a technological measure.239 In essence, Section 1201 claims
amount to a federal rule against reverse engineering technological protection of
copyrighted works.
Congress created an exception to these new section 1201 claims where a party
engages in RE for purposes of discovery and use of IO to develop an independent
interoperable product.240 The legislative history makes clear that “[t]he purpose of this
[exception] is to foster competition and innovation in the computer and software
industry.”241 Section 1201(f)(1) of the DMCA provides a defense to a claim that a person
has circumvented technical protection of a copyrighted work to develop an interoperable
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program and 1201(f)(2) provides a defense where a person develops and employs a tool
to circumvent for purposes of interoperability. 242 Section 1201(f)(1) states:
a person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer
program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of
identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary
to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program
with other programs, and that have not previously been readily available to
the person engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of
identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under this
title.243
Section 1201(f)(3) provides:
The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph (1),
and the means permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available to
others if the person referred to in paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be,
provides such information or means solely for the purpose of enabling IO
of an independently created computer program with other programs, and
to the extent that doing so does not constitute infringement under this title
or violate applicable law other than this section.244
There is some ambiguity about what 1201(f)(3) addresses.245 One interpretation
is that it covers the scenario where a developer outsources to a third party the RE to
discover IO. A second interpretation is that it addresses the issue of whether an
interoperability developer is free to distribute a product which includes IO obtained by
the means and tools of 1201(f)(1) and (2).246 Regardless of the interpretation, 1201(f)(3)
requires that the acts of identification and analysis neither (1) constitute copyright
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infringement (which is also required if the work is done in-house) nor (2) violate
“applicable law”.
There is no detailed language in Section 1201 which provides that a contract term
restricting RE is invalid. However, a comparison of the particular wording of subsections
1201(f)(1) and (f)(2) with subsection 1201(f)(3) and the exceptions for encryption
research (1201(g)), protection of personally identifiable information (1201(i)), and
security research (1201(j) may bear on the question of supremacy of federal
interoperability policy vis a vis enforcement of a contract term to the contrary. Although
all three 1201(f) subsections require that “any such acts of identification and analysis . . .
not constitute [copyright] infringement,” only (f)(3) adds the requirement that other
“applicable law” not be violated.247 Likewise, the encryption research, protection of
personally identifiable information and security testing sections require that either
“applicable law” or “other law” not be violated.
“Applicable law” is not defined in the statute. There are a number of possible
interpretations of the 1201(f) exceptions on the question of preemption of contrary
contract terms. 248 One is that “applicable law” solely refers to statutory and regulatory
law.249 A second interpretation is that “applicable law” includes contract law, but the
omission of “applicable law” from 1201(f)(1) and (2) merely reflects Congressional
intent that a defense will not be lost under those subsections where the RE violates a
contract. As such, the RE is lawful under 1201, but that leaves contract law enforceable.
A third interpretation is that “applicable law” includes contract law and the absence of
this requirement in 1201(f)(1) and (2) preempts an inconsistent contract term, as a matter
of either implicit preemption or conflict preemption. The point is that if a court were to
enforce a contract restriction notwithstanding 1201(f)(1) and (2), the purpose of Congress
to foster interoperability would be frustrated.
In interpreting the statute, arguably construing (f)(3) as addressing solely the
outsourcing of RE may be the most plausible if one is trying to minimize the situations
where preemption of contract law may occur. The point is that the absence of the
requirement to comply with applicable law in (f)(1) and (2) to qualify for the RE
exception to a circumvention claim arguably indicates a Congressional intent that federal
policy favoring RE for interoperability is more important than enforcing a contractual
restriction on such activity and therefore conflict preemption is required as to an
247

Interestingly, section 1201 uses different language for different exceptions: protection of personally
identifying information under section 1201(i) must not be “ in violation of any other law”; security testing
under 1201(j) must “not constitute infringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than
this section, including section 1030 of title 18 and those provisions of title 18 amended by the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.”; encryption research under 1201(g) must “not constitute infringement
under this title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including section 1030 of title 18 and
those provisions of title 18 amended by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.”
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Professor Ginsburg suggested the possibility that a mistake accounts for the absence of “applicable law”
from 1201(f)(1)-(2).
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For example, this might cover the Atari scenario where defense counsel violated copyright rules in
obtaining a copy of plaintiff’s work deposited with the library of Congress. See Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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inconsistent license term. The basis for the distinction in treatment under (f)(1) and (f)(2)
as contrasted with (f)(3) is to place greater constraints on a third party who is hired to
undertake RE. Where such a third party is involved, contract law could restrict any such
RE. Arguably this reflects a Congressional concern that outsourcing sensitive RE is
disfavored in the law. 250
Unfortunately, the legislative history on this provision is silent on the relationship
between the statute and contract terms purporting to restrict RE. However, the House
Report is clear on the federal policy of promoting interoperabilitiy of software programs:
Section 1201(f) is intended to promote reverse engineering by permitting
the circumvention of access control technologies for the sole purpose of
achieving software interoperability. Section 102(f)(1) permits the act of
circumvention in only certain instances. To begin with, the copy of the
computer program which is the subject of the analysis must be lawfully
acquired (i.e., the computer program must be acquired from a legitimate
source, along with any necessary serial codes, passwords, or other such
means as may be necessary to be able to use the program as it was
designed to be used by a consumer of the product). In addition, the acts
must be limited to those elements of the program which must be analyzed
to achieve interoperability of an independently created program with other
programs. The resulting product must also be a new and original work, in
that it may not infringe the original computer program. Moreover, the
objective of the analysis must be to achieve interoperability which are not
otherwise available to the person. Finally, the goal of this section is to
ensure that current law is not changed, and not to encourage or permit
infringement. Thus, each of the acts undertaken must avoid infringing the
copyright of the author of the underlying computer program.251
In sum, Congress recognized the importance of RE to discover and use IO. In
addition, a close reading of the particular language used by Congress suggests that
Section 1201 (f)(1) and (2) may preempt252 state contract law to the extent a contract term
prohibits a party from RE solely for the purpose of developing an interoperable product
in instances where a party internally undertakes the necessary RE because such a term
frustrates the purpose of Section 1201(f).
Cumulatively, the fair use decisions and Section 1201(f) reflect a federal policy in
favor of RE for purposes of discovery and use of IO where the information is needed to
250

If that is the case, it simply provides further support for why the current regulation competition among
the states and foreign jurisdictions on the enforceability of contract restrictions on RE is contrary to federal
patent law and policy against such regulatory competition, particularly where, as here, the net effect may
contradict federal patent interests because parties may outsource such activity internationally and thereby
benefit industry in foreign jurisdictions at the expense of the U.S. economy. See discussion infra Part VI.
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House Report, Committee on Commerce, Rept. 105-551, Part 2, at p. 42.
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This is a case of “explicit” preemption because Congress implies in the structure and purpose of section
1201(f) that federal law will preempt state law. See ROBERT A. GORMAN AND JANE C. GINSBURG,
COPYRIGHT 902 (6th ed. 2002).
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develop an interoperable independent program.253 In addition, the federal interest is so
strong that arguably Congress has preempted contract terms to the contrary where a
company circumvents technological protection of a copyrighted work in-house so that it
can develop an interoperable product.
For the reasons discussed in Part III and reinforced in the copyright fair use cases
discussed above, the debate in the courts and the literature has been misplaced in
focusing primarily on whether the above articulated federal copyright policy supporting
interoperability requires preemption of enforcement of a mass market license term to the
contrary by virtue of Section 301 of the Copyright Act or a copyright conflicts theory.254
With the exception of one Circuit,255 the trend of the courts is that RE prohibitions in
mass market licenses are not preempted.256
For the reasons discussed in this article, scrutiny of patent and trade secret law
provides the proper lens for considering the propriety of enforcing state contract law
restrictions on RE to discover IO. However, patent preemption is not the sole—and in
fact should be the last—resort for any court considering the enforceability of a nonnegotiated mass market license restriction on RE for purposes of interoperability. For
that reason, public policy exceptions to contract law need to be reviewed.
Part V.

Public Policy Exception to Contract Law: Balancing Federal
Interoperability Policy, Trade Secret and Contract Interests
A.

Public Policy Exception to Contract Law

In addition to the compelling patent preemption basis for invalidating certain nonnegotiated mass market license terms which prohibit RE for interoperability purposes, a
review of state contract law principles also supports invalidation. It is well established
law that public policy may outweigh freedom of contract.257
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Federal policy in favor of RE is also codified as an exception to the scope of protection of
semiconductor chip products. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 excuses RE of a
semiconductor chip where the party “reproduce[s] the mask work solely for the purpose of teaching,
analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques embodied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic flow,
or organization of components used in the mask work; or . . . incorporates the results of such conduct in an
original mask work. . . .” 17 U.S.C. §904 (2001).
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One key question is whether a mass market contract term can override the
fundamental trade secret principle of freedom to RE a lawfully acquired, publicly
available product. The two times courts have considered anything close to this question,
they have determined that an asserted obligation running with a publicly available
product cannot override the freedom to RE. In Chicago Lock, the Ninth Circuit held that
“[i]mposing an obligation of nondisclosure on lock owners . . . would frustrate the intent
of California courts to disallow protection to trade secrets discovered through ‘fair and
honest means.’”
In DVD Copy Control, Justice Moreno directly addressed the issue of the
relationship of trade secret policy and contract law, and strongly suggested that a mass
market restriction prohibiting RE would conflict with California trade secret law.258
This same public policy contract override principle is embodied in section 105 of
UCITA, now adopted as the law of Maryland and Virginia.259
Under section 105(b) of UCITA, a contract term may be unenforceable if it
“violates a fundamental public policy,” with particular emphasis on federal policy:
(b) [Fundamental public policy controls.] If a term of a contract violates
a fundamental public policy, the court may refuse to enforce the contract,
enforce the remainder of the contract without the impermissible term, or
limit the application of the impermissible term so as to avoid a result
contrary to public policy, in each case to the extent that the interest in
enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement
of the term.260
Comment 3 to section 105 provides:
3. Public Policy Invalidation. Contract terms may be unenforceable
because of federal preemption under subsection (a) of this section or
because they are unconscionable under Section 111. In addition,
subsection (b) sets out the legal principle that terms may be unenforceable
if they violate a fundamental public policy that clearly overrides the policy
favoring enforcement of private transactions as between the parties. The
principle that courts may invalidate a term of a contract on public policy
258

See discussion supra at Part IV.C.
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In addition to section 105(b), section 118 specifically overrides terms prohibiting RE to discover the IO
information necessary and otherwise unavailable to develop an independent interoperable program. In
essence, UCITA has indirectly adopted the European Union approach by following the approach in section
1201(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Comment 4 to section 118 makes clear that this is the
first time an express contract invalidation rule has been adopted on this issue.
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Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) §105(b) (2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
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grounds is recognized at common law and in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 178 et. seq. See, e.g., Livingston v. Tapscott, 585 So. 2d 839
(Ala. 1991); Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 293
N.W.2d 843 (Neb. 1980).261
In addition the Comment notes that “[i]n light of the national and international
integration of the digital economy, courts should be reluctant to invalidate terms based on
purely local policies.”262 However, the Comment particularly identifies “innovation,
competition, fair comment and fair use” as “[t]he offsetting public policies most likely to
apply to transactions within this Act.”263 In addition, it notes that “contractual terms,
particularly those arising from a context without negotiation, may be impermissible if
they violate fundamental public policy.”264
On the issue of balancing trade secret and contract law interests, the
commentators noted the inherent tension:
Trade secret law allows information to be transferred subject to
considerable contractual limitations on disclosure which facilitates the
exploitation and commercial application of new technology. On the other
hand, trade secret law does not prohibit reverse engineering of lawfully
acquired goods available on the open market. Striking the appropriate
balance depends on a variety of contextual factors that can only be
assessed on a case-by-case basis with an eye to national policies.265
This is precisely the concern raised by Justice Moreno in DVD Copy Control discussed
in Part III C above, where he indicates that a non-negotiated mass market consumer
license term cannot override the trade secret policy of freedom to RE. 266
The Comment also notes that federal copyright and patent laws should be
considered as relevant fundamental public policy:
[C]ourts also may look to federal copyright and patent laws for guidance
on what types of limitations on the rights of owners of information
ordinarily seem appropriate, recognizing, however, that private parties
ordinarily have sound commercial reasons for contracting for limitations
on use and that enforcing private ordering arrangements in itself reflects a
fundamental public policy enacted throughout the Uniform Commercial
Code and common law.267
261
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The Comment then directly identifies RE as an area where courts will need to
weigh competing policies:
In part because of the transformations caused by digital information, many
areas of public information policy are in flux and subject to extensive
debate. In several instances these debates are conducted within the domain
of copyright or patent laws, such as whether copying a copyrighted work
for purposes of reverse engineering is an infringement. This Act does not
address these issues of national intellectual property policy, but how they
are resolved may be instructive to courts in applying this subsection. One
national statement of policy on the relationship between reverse
engineering, security testing, and copyright in digital information can be
found at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999). It recognizes a policy not to prohibit
some forms of reverse engineering . . . .This policy may or may not
outweigh a contract term to the contrary. See Section 118 for provisions
dealing with reverse engineering for purposes of interoperability and
Official Comment 3 to that section. . . . This subsection deals with
policies that implicate the broader public interest and the balance between
enforcing private transactions and the need to protect the public domain
of information.268
Arguably, UCITA and its Official Comment reflect general principles. As such, courts in
non-UCITA jurisdictions should find the analysis useful in weighing competing public
policies. Courts should also take heed of the Prefatory Note to the USTA concerning the
balance between patent and trade secret policy.269
In sum, there is a path for courts to find that federal patent and copyright law and
policies, coupled with the fundamental trade secret law principle of the freedom to RE
publicly available products cumulatively outweigh the general policy of freedom of
contract in the case of a non-negotiated mass market contract term barring RE for
interoperability purposes. UCITA and its commentary are path breaking in the United
States for expressly recognizing the potential adverse policy implications of enforcing
mass market license terms which may be interpreted to restrict RE for purposes of
interoperability.
B.

A Reasonable Contract Interpretation Path

Cumulatively, there are strong public policy reasons why any mass market license
term prohibiting RE should be invalidated solely to the extent that it bars RE for purposes
of developing an interoperable product. However, to avoid the difficult issue of deciding
whether public policy requires invalidating a contract term, a preferred approach is for
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courts to interpret narrowly any clauses addressing RE to limit their application when
properly viewed against the background of competing public policies.
Such an approach would be supported by the doctrine of contra proferentum (i.e.,
any ambiguity in a contract should be construed against the drafter).270 The argument is
that a reasonable drafter using the undefined phrase “reverse engineer” would be
presumed to be aware of the federal copyright policies supporting RE for interoperability,
the primacy of federal patent policies in regulating access to and use of IO, and the
general trade secret principle of freedom to RE products generally available in the
marketplace. Since the phrase “reverse engineer” is ambiguous and could be construed
either to be consistent with or antagonistic to these federal and state trade secret policies,
the former interpretation should be employed. This same approach can be reached if a
court were to find that federal principles need to be applied to limit the scope of the
contract term.271
This approach does not preclude negotiation of a contract term restricting RE
which includes prohibitions on the discovery and use IO.272 Rather, the proper analysis
of such a clause is state court enforcement of statutory waivers.273
With the above patent preemption, public policy invalidation, and contract
interpretation analyses in mind, let’s return to a particular example of a closed platform in
the marketplace.
C.

A Case Study: Apple iTUNES

Given the fact that courts have applied California law to restrict RE274 and that
Apple is an example of a closed technologist275 where third parties and consumers have
made clear a desire for interoperable products, iTunes presents a good case study for
application of the approach suggested in this article.

270

But see S.O.S. , Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting application of California
rule of contra proferentum to copyright license where it would override proposition that copyright does not
impliedly grant rights). See also Lemley, supra note 142, at 161 (noting that “[o]ther cases . . . impose
federal restrictions on contract terms in order to protect important aspects of federal policy”).
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reasons outlined in this Article. See e.g., Patent 6,871,349 covers a "method and apparatus for relaying
events intended for a first application program to a second application program." David Akhond, Gregory
Scown, and Johnathon Kaminar are listed as the inventors. The patent was filed September 29, 2000 and
was awarded March 22, 2005. (reported in www.thinksecret.com Apple Patent Watch March/April 2005,
http://www.thinksecret.com/news/patents05may.html ) (last visited 2/16/06).

59

1.

Contract Interpretation

The Apple iTunes license276 is the starting place for the analysis:
2. Permitted License Uses and Restrictions. This License allows you to
install and use the Apple Software. The Apple Software may be used to
reproduce materials so long as such use is limited to reproduction of noncopyrighted materials, materials in which you own the copyright, or
materials you are authorized or legally permitted to reproduce. You may
not make the Apple Software available over a network where it could be
used by multiple computers at the same time. You may make one copy of
the Apple Software in machine-readable form for backup purposes only;
provided that the backup copy must include all copyright or other
proprietary notices contained on the original. Except as and only to the
extent expressly permitted in this License or by applicable law, you may
not copy, decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, modify, or create
derivative works of the Apple Software or any part thereof . . . 277
Arguably a reasonable interpretation of the language, “[e]xcept as . . . expressly
permitted . . . by applicable law” should include consideration of the California Uniform
Trade Secrets Act. Section 3426.1 (a) of the Act expressly states, “[r]everse
engineering . . . alone shall not be considered improper means.” The reasoning of the
California Supreme Court in Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corp.278and of
Justice Moreno in DVD Copy Control279 coupled with the analysis of the Ninth Circuit in
Chicago Lock280 all support the proposition that California contract law must be read in a
manner consistent with California trade secrets law.
Accordingly, the express proviso in Paragraph 2 of the iTUNES license should be
read to permit RE for interoperability purposes, particularly when other federal public
policies favoring interoperability are considered. However, if a court were to interpret
the clause to cover RE for interoperability purposes, a contract public policy analysis
should lead to invalidation.
2.

Contract Public Policy Analysis: California Law – Balancing
Competing Trade Secret, Federal Patent and Copyright Laws
with Freedom of Contract Policies

No California court (or federal court applying California law) has expressly ruled
on the issue of whether the public policies embodied in federal copyright and patent law
favoring RE solely for interoperability purposes and California trade secret law override
276
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enforcement of a shrink or web wrap license prohibiting RE for purposes of discovery
and use of IO to develop an independent interoperable product.281 A close analysis of
one key amendment to the language of the UTSA as adopted by the California legislature
provides support for the fundamental importance of freedom to RE as a limit on the scope
of California state trade secret law. Rather than satisfying itself with reference to RE as a
“proper means” to acquire a trade secret in the Official Comment to the UTSA, the
California Legislature modified the UTSA and added the following positive statement at
the end of the definition of “improper means”: “Reverse engineering or independent
derivation alone shall not be considered improper means.”282
In one of the leading California cases discussing California trade secret law, the
California Supreme Court made clear that the freedom to RE a publicly available product
codified in Section 3426.1 (a) of the California Trade Secret Acts was a fundamental
distinction between trade secret protection and patent law:
Thus, the legal protection accorded trade secrets is fundamentally different
from that given to patents, in which the patent owner acquires a limited
term monopoly over the patented technology, and use of that technology
by whatever means infringes the patent. The owner of the trade secret is
protected only against the appropriation of the secret by improper means
and the subsequent use or disclosure of the improperly acquired secret.
There are various legitimate means, such as reverse engineering, by which
a trade secret can be acquired and used. (See 2 Callman, The Law of
Unfair Competition, Trademarks, and Monopolies (1981) § 14.01, p. 14-6;
id., § 14.15, p. 14-102.)283
In addition, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Chicago Lock supports the
proposition that the freedom to RE a publicly available product is a fundamental public
policy which underlies California law.284 Finally, Justice Moreno’s analysis in his
concurrence in DVD Copy Control casts serious doubt on the enforceability, under
California law, of a non-negotiated mass market license term barring RE for purposes of
interoperability.285
When viewed together with the general public policy analysis discussed in Part V
A above, there appear to be very compelling reasons why the Apple RE restriction, if
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somehow interpreted to preclude RE for purposes of developing an interoperable product,
should be invalidated as a matter of public policy.
3.

Patent Preemption

If for some reason a public policy invalidation were not applied, then the patent
preemption analysis presented in this article provides a strong case for preemption.
Otherwise, Apple would have a reasonable alternative to patent protection under the
guise of a non-negotiated mass market contract-enforced trade secret providing nationwide rights.
Ironically, if courts interpret the Apple mass market license clause broadly to
preclude RE for interoperability and proceed to enforce the clause notwithstanding
competing public policy and patent preemption claims, Apple’s competitors very well
may be incented to conduct RE activities directed toward interoperability in jurisdictions
whose policies favor interoperability over contract. In fact, the mere presence of such
legally untested terms in a license may have a chilling effect on U.S.-based development
and incent developers to move offshore. It is precisely that result which highlights yet
another reason why state regulatory competition in protection of IO clashes with federal
patent and copyright policies.
Part VI. The International Landscape
While the contract/interoperability debate continues in the U.S., an increasing
number of critical foreign jurisdictions are adopting a policy that interoperability
overrides contract terms to the contrary. This development is significant on several
levels: (1) it reflects different public policy approaches; (2) it sheds light on the potential
dissonance between recent U.S. state contract law decisions upholding RE prohibitions
and foreign rules overriding contract terms in favor of interoperability policy; and (3) it
provides a clear example of IP rule arbitrage286 which is but one type of jurisdictional
rule competition287.
Considered in this light, the trend in a number of significant foreign jurisdictions
is to favor interoperability over freedom of contract in their jurisdiction (consistent with
the Kewanee and Bonito Boats analysis in Part III C above) and to encourage investment
in interoperability-related research and development in their jurisdiction, arguably at the
expense of the United States.288
As a starting point, the EU Directive on Software Protection was pioneering in
expressly addressing the policy conflict between enforcing contract terms and
encouraging interoperable software. Article 6 makes clear that contract terms prohibiting
286
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RE are invalid where a lawful possessor needs to decompile a software program to
ascertain information necessary to and not otherwise available to achieve
interoperabilty.289
A review of a number of key industrial and developing countries reveals that the
European Union,290 Australia,291 China,292 India,293 and Indonesia,294 all have laws
whereby a contract term restricting RE for purposes of developing an independent
interoperable program is unenforceable. Two different doctrinal approaches lead to this
result. Some jurisdictions have adopted some form of Article 6 of European Directive.
The second approach is application of a “public policy” exception to contract
enforcement and recognition that copyright policy permits RE to discover and use IO to
develop an independent interoperable product. China, India and Indonesia are examples
of this second approach.
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Article 6 provides:
Article 6 Decompilation
1. The authorization of the rightholder shall not be required where reproduction of the
code and translation of its form within the meaning of Article 4 (a) and (b) are
indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an
independently created computer program with other programs, provided that the
following conditions are met:
(a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another person having a right to use a
copy of a program, or on their behalf by a person authorized to to so;
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously been readily
available to the persons referred to in subparagraph (a); and
(c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program which are necessary to
achieve interoperability.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the information obtained through its
application:
(a) to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of the independently
created computer program;
(b) to be given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability of the
independently created computer program; or
(c) to be used for the development, production or marketing of a computer program
substantially similar in its expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright.
3. In accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention for the protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, the provisions of this Article may not be interpreted in such
a way as to allow its application to be used in a manner which unreasonably prejudices
the right holder's legitimate interests or conflicts with a normal exploitation of the
computer program.
Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs.
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Regardless of the doctrinal approach adopted, the point is an increasing number of
critical countries with growing technology industries allow RE for interoperability
purposes notwithstanding a contract term to the contrary. The net result is that an IO
developer may be incented to outsource interoperability related development to one of
these countries, at the expense of U.S. industry.295
Part VII. Conclusion
Inherent in the Intellectual Property clause of the Constitution is the primacy of
the patent regime to provide incentives to create useful arts. For this reason, courts, as
early as Baker, have held that copyright cannot be used as an instrument to effect a
“patent-like monopoly” on the format for data entry necessary to practice a useful art. In
the computer era, this teaching is reflected in recent cases holding that copyright in
software cannot be used as an instrument to protect the data formats and other functional
information which inheres in a program and is necessary for interoperation with another
computer program.
Notwithstanding this primacy of patent law to protect IO, courts and
commentators have mistakenly focused on copyright principles to determine the propriety
of state contract law (shrink and web wrap licenses) as an instrument to control discovery
and use of such information. However, patent preemption, trade secret and general
contract principles provide the correct lens for considering the enforceability of such
license restrictions. The Supreme Court decisions in Kewanee and Bonito Boats are clear
that if state regulation of information is not weaker than patent law and in effect
competes with patent protection and its limited term, it must be preempted.
A careful analysis of mass market license terms restricting discovery and use of
IO for purposes of developing an interoperable product appears to fail the test because a
technologist may elect state protection by use of contract law to protect IO rather than
obtain a patent. Furthermore, there is serious regulatory competition as evidenced by
rulings of the Seventh, Eighth, and Federal Circuits which could be interpreted as
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See e.g., Ann Harrison, Battle Brews Over Reverse Engineering, (May 8, 2000) (available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/05/08/reverse.engineering.idg/) (last visited January 18,
2006)(“Meanwhile, some developers are moving their reverse-engineering projects offshore to avoid U.S.
rules.”) A key remaining question is whether the ultimate independently developed interoperable product
can lawfully be imported (if developed outside the U.S.) and distributed in the U.S. The issue requires a
conflict of law analysis, which is beyond the scope of this Article. There are arguments that foreign law
(such as Art. 6 of the EU Software Directive) would control and make it lawful to reverse engineer in a
foreign country (e.g. in an EU country) notwithstanding a license prohibition, and that the licensor could
not assert breach of contract for the subsequent distribution in the U.S. of an independently developed
program that used the information lawfully obtained in Europe. Suffice it to say, this is an open question
and the mere potential that interoperability developers may pursue such international outsourcing highlights
an ironic implication of enforcement of mass market terms restricting RE for interoperability purposes
where interoperabilty is consistent with federal policies. The irony is compounded if Congress has
intended to limit the exception to a DMCA section 1201 claim to prevent outsourcing of RE of technical
protection of a copyrighted work. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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providing a basis for such state regulation by contract as contrasted with the Third and
Fifth Circuits, and UCITA jurisdictions. The net effect of this regulation competition is
that interoperability developers may be incented to outsource research and development
related to interoperability to one of the increasing number of key foreign jurisdictions
with law consistent with federal policy that would override a contract term restricting RE
to discover and use IO for purposes of developing an interoperable product.
Enlightened courts can avoid this conflict by using classic contract interpretation
tools to limit application of mass market clauses on RE to exclude IO discovered solely
to develop an interoperable product. In the rare case of an unavoidable conflict, courts
can rely on traditional contract public policy doctrine to invalidate a term to the extent it
impairs such activity. Thus, it is only in the rare case where a court does not find either
of these principles available will patent preemption be mandated.
The centrality of interoperability in the computer, telecommunication and related
industries cannot be taken lightly – ultimately whether such innovation is incented by U.S.
law or parties are encouraged to outsource internationally that critical development has
dramatic long term implications on U.S. industry and the economy. Accordingly it is
imperative that courts begin to address the issue of protection of IO in a clearer fashion,
with proper reference to the delicate balance of incentives including the primacy of patent
law and policy established by the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Finally, application of the patent preemption/public policy analysis outlined in
this Article to any case where contract law leads to a de facto monopoly on useful data
may perhaps be of even greater significance than the issue of interoperability, which is
but one type of functional information. Arguably this analysis provides a new lens to
consider ProCD-type licenses which protect uncopyrightable useful data and suggests a
limiting principle, beyond copyright, to address risks of monopolizing such data under
the guise of contract law.
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